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A Theoretical Introduction to the Poietical 
                                                          
                                                 Introduction 
What Tellhistory is 
In 2012, a diplomacy student called Alex Whitcomb was traveling with his wife and 
a colleague to do a camp research in Kurdistan. Indeed, to resume the Kurdistan’s 
history would be a too ambitious venture for our simple purpose: we should just 
remind to the reader that Kurdistan has always existed as a nation, or rather more 
nations, but it never reached the desired statal condition, due to the fragmentary 
situation of  the territory divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Hence, it is not 
difficult to guess the condition of  kurdish historiographical apparatus: often censured 
by other transnational powers, forgotten with the disease of  kurdish identity, almost 
completely ignored by European historical interest. On the other hand, Alex once told 
me, kurdish people developed a genuine (and sometimes exhausting) attitude to tell 
their stories during any possible collective  event. During one of  those nights passed by 
listening to his wife’s father tales, the idea of  Tellhistory was conceived for the first 
time.  
Everyone has a story to tell, everyone loves to listen to a different story, but no one 
knows where the story ‘happens’, literally we lack of  a place where to narrate our tales. 
Tellhistory was initially thought with this aim: to become a place, or rather the place 
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of  all the places in which the stories and the memories of  individuals are narrated. In 
this sense, Tellhistory definitely constitutes a mapping experiment. Writing what 
Tellhistory is represents the greatest obstacle to the realization of  this thesis : by being 
essentially a visual and auditive experience - explicitly opposed to the form of  the text 
- we can only delimit our description to a simple formula: Tellhistory is a free platform 
in which anyone is allowed to record and release their own memories concerning 
historical-sociological events by using the medium of  video-messages.  
In the section “Our Mission” of  the Tellhistory’s website you can read: 
“How many people do you know with great stories? How many of  them will be 
remembered?  We are all making history and no one’s contribution should be 
forgotten. 
Tell History is democratizing the way history is told, recorded and shared. This 
is a job far too important–and far too large–to be left to academics alone. 
We give you the tools to save these stories. Why? Because the memories that 
matter to you, your family, and your community are incredibly valuable, but they 
are also fragile. They deserve to be passed on to future generations. 
We offer a place for personal experiences to be preserved. Every new story 
contributes to a better understanding of  the world we live in today. 
We all shape the future, and we all should be present in the past.” 
They way Tellhistory operates is incredibly simple and intuitive. The team of  
interviewer creates a topic, for example “Tangentopoli” or “President Obama”, which 
are afterward collected under these particular categories: Politics and Society, Culture, 
Business, International Conflicts, Environment, Civil Wars and Revolutions, Science 
and Technology, Disasters, Terrorism, Peace, Genocide. The interviewer is meant to 
choose a particular place where to base his inquiry with the intent of  creating a net of  
stories marked by the same original discourse. Indeed, the greatest appeal of  
Tellhistory’s project relies in its sort of  dispersing look toward the topic: an argument 
immediately generates a new argument and the tread of  the story multiplies and 
complicates the interactions within the plots.  
The interviewer plays an interesting role in the research: he is asked to record and 
to interview, so to actively participate to the moment of  narration by interrogating and 
deepening, but he is also meant to be ‘invisible’. That means that when the interviewer 
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cuts the video recording, he must disappear: his voice fades out and his presence is 
erased. Why? 
Tellhistory is in toto an experiment: as any experiment, it acts according to a model 
of  reality and with a specific aim. The model of  reality is unavoidably that of  
globalization realized in the image of  the global map: every record, once registered in 
the website, is pointed in the virtual map which indicates where the interview was 
released. This feature represents the deep core of  the project: whereas a topic may 
involve a specific geographical zone (“President Obama” will obviously engage mostly 
with an american audience), the network of  tellers spreads everywhere, showing how 
the geographical limits can be easily transcended by the personal perception of  
history. Hence, the above mentioned topic “President Obama” will be narrated by a 
community way larger than the sole american one : among the Historytellers you 
would find people living in The Netherlands, in Morocco, Finland, Brazil, Kurdistan, 
Greece, Thailand, Italy, Canada etc.  
Nevertheless, the initial goal of  tellhistory was to find a motif, a reason for people to 
voluntarily release and record their memories by themselves, with the freedom to 
launch their own topics or trends without any restriction. Therefore, the inherent aim 
of  Tellhistory is the one to educate people from all over the world to oral history. This 
is the main reason why the interviewer, which in a sense constitutes the vital nerve of  
the project, is finally supposed to disappear from the recorded memory. Useless to say, 
this modus operandi turns out to be the geniality and at the same time the major limit of  
the project. 
What Tellhistory could be 
In many ways, I started to consider Tellhistory a pretext.  
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Firstly, it represents a pre-text to the extent that it evades the conventional textuality 
of  historiography by presenting a vocal testimony of  experience with the precise intent 
to challenge the exclusive and dominant status of  written history. Pre-text, also in the 
sense according to which it operates to become a database for historiography to be 
written differently, for example accounting the singular experience of  the individual 
and his sphere of  interpretation which breeds from it.  
But there is a second, negative reason that made me engage Tellhistory in the form 
of  a pretext: that is, the project fell into a failure. 
“If  Tellhistory can interest someone, those are a few History students in Harvard 
and maybe a branch of  anthropologists”, Alex told me during our last conversation on 
Skype. It seems, (and I tragically experienced it by trying to extrapolate memories 
from people down in the streets, waiting at the airport, chilling at the University’s 
cafeteria) that despite there might be many reason to listen to a stranger’s story, its way 
more difficult to make people confident, or rather motivated to share their memories 
with a global audience. It seems that while the epoch of  social media is increasingly 
feeding our egos by furnishing different tools to set our social image, namely to 
improve our fictional skills, it is not yet ready to make the individual a full and 
responsible user of  the web in the area of  knowledge: area in which history is 
supposed to cover a determinant role in this time of  shocking and uncatchable 
changes.  
The reason for this failure might be several: from the simple website setting, which 
distinguishes it from the average social media in which the user is asked to contributes 
with his own reactions (likes and comments), to the contingent fact that people don’t 
feel history to be a big issue for their life’s experience.  
Nevertheless, this failure is absolutely eloquent because Tellhistory tried for the first 
time to enter the dimension of  what I will call the poietical, a dimension which is not 
completely present in our era but still ongoing: somehow, I feel Tellhistory’s failure to 
be completely positive for foreseeing the present and the future, the same way the Paris 
Commune’s failure was explicative and constructive for the raising of  Communism.   
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Accordingly, Tellhistory works in this thesis as a pretext to the extent that it 
represents a limit-thought for our reflection concerning the possible new status of  oral 
history within the Bildung of  a new ‘global’ community.  
Hence, this thesis attempts to discuss the three main problematics that Tellhistory 
opened up with is extremely valuable work.  
The first chapter, entitled “The Narrative”, will provide a short critique to the 
conventional relationship between word, fact and experience: here will firstly emerge 
the basilar dualistic frame that governed the problem of  narrative by separating the 
official, general, scientific claim of  historiography from the personal, variable and 
subjective narrative of  the individual. This reflection will depart from accounting a 
double crisis of  narrative: the one of  experience, which forbids any personal narration 
to become paradigmatic for other individuals, and the one of  scientific discourses, 
differently carried out by several postmodernist thinkers, that argues the inherently 
interpretative and therefore subjective status of  sciences (among which 
historiography), which prevents them to reach the claim for universality they pursuit. 
By trying to find a new configuration that would integrate and to rehabilitate these two 
narratives, our argument will approach the foucaultian idea of  an “history of  the 
present”, the only model that would simultaneously unify the formalization of  the past 
with the constant interpretation promoted by the individuals in the present.  
The second chapter, named “The Voice”, will examine all the possible reasons 
according to which the materiality of  voice would embody the best tool to carry on the 
claim for an history of  the present: we should say that whereas the first chapter 
engages the problem of  the message, the second discusses the problem of  the medium. 
Accordingly, we will attempt to disentangle the human voice from Derrida’s popular 
critique of  logocentrism, by comparing it with several different models that picture the 
voice as a collective connecter as well as the only medium capable to give the full 
dimensions of  the human: his feelings, his imaginary, his activity into the real world.  
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The last chapter, which takes the name of  “The Community”, departs from the 
possibility for an heterogeneous group of  ‘vocalized individuals’ to constitute a 
community, namely a  group definable according to common parameters. For the 
voice turns out to be the element which transcends all the particular claims for identity, 
the essential experience of  language will become the fundamental experience of  a 
globalized word. What we will be stressing is that, in this plateau, the language is no 
longer separable from action: by being configured as an action-in-progress, the 
respective community cannot be completely defined once for all; it can only be 
performed within the univocal sphere of  voice/language. It is at this point that we will 
introduce for the first time the concept of  poietical, which assumes different shades 
depending on the noun that precedes it: somehow, it will attempt to reorganize 
historiography, narrative and community around a model that accounts the universal 
experience of  language through its vocalization, and consequently the necessary 
presence of  a form of  action that is performed by all the individuals, be them aware or 
not.  
If  we should synthesize the problem of  this thesis in a single question, we should 
ask: “How can a community which lacks of  its own narrative attempts to vocalize it?”. 
Indeed, this question might sound too cryptic because it gathers three more essential 
questions: “Is globalization able to move toward a singular community?” “How can 
this community elaborate its own narrative?” and finally  “Can this narrative be 
achieved through the medium of  spoken language?”. 
It is clear that all these questions depart from a necessity to demonstrate the 
incredible value of  Tellhistory : nonetheless, is not the particular function or reality of  
Tellhistory ‘as a tool’ that is discussed, or even put at stake, in this essay.  If  anything, is 
what Tellhistory let open, the breach which it created with its own work, its own limit 
that constitutes the central focus of  this work.  
In a sense, the author of  this thesis will behave more as the interviewed rather than 
as the interviewer: he will depart from objective, ‘academic’ questions, and he will 
move toward critics, representations, idiosyncrasies which might achieve interesting 
conclusions or miserable failures. He will often forget about Tellhistory: as those who, 
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in front of  a camera, began with telling their impressions concerning a particular 
historical event, and then they suddenly switched to related memories, unexpressed 
fantasies, deluded expectations, ironical interpretations. For all this inconveniences, the 
author should apologize: but we hope that exactly this point, this continuos turning 
out the language, with the related impossibility to define who the author is, and who 
the audience, and what the topic, might constitutes the most precious key to access this 
work.  
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The Narrative 
Chapter One 
1.1 For an historical storytelling 
The first chapter of  this thesis will be trying to define the relationship between 
narrative and history with the aim of  providing an alternative method for the 
recording, writing, and interpretation of  a field still in process of  auto-definition : the 
“global history”.  
In order to show up the limits of  what is called “global history”, a discipline that 
Dominic Sachsenmaier has defined an “intellectual trend” rather than a proper 
historical field , we would not go only through the broad critique that is been carried 1
against - or in favor of  - this discipline; we will also attempt to demonstrate its limits 
when it is approached as a narration and, specifically, as a storytelling. According to 
this second approach, the main questions will be: Who might be the author of  this 
story? Who the addressee? What might be the form of  the message involved in this 
narration? Finally, could we possibly validate this narration as something effective, 
shared, and, above all, true?  
This ambitious purpose of  leading “global history” under the domaine of  
“storytelling”, must face the difficulty of  assimilate global history to a canonical 
historiographic field. This difficulty could be expressed in at least two aspects: the first 
concerns the form and the method of  this history, whose proportions cannot 
apparently be limited to the textual forms proper of  cultural studies; the second 
problem, intrinsically epistemological, doubts about the actual existence of  a global 
past which could guarantee the construction of  a global historiography. If  this past 
doesn’t exist, we should consider the possibility to establish a new form historiography 
which, in the impossibility to be built upon a ground of  past events, can only rely to 
 D. Sachsenmaier, Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected World, Cambridge 1
University Press, Cambridge 2011, p. 18
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the experience of  an ongoing present. As I will try to suggest, it is precisely in this 
possibility to make the present historical (and history present) that individual 
storytelling arises with an unexpected power.  
If  historiography and storytelling share the same structural possibility of  ‘being 
narrated’, they differ for the extent in which the first one is generally considered non-
fictional, objective, scientific, whereas the second one is often relegated in the area of  
subjectivity, performance, and fiction. The major effort made in order to state how 
fictional and historical narration are able to manifestate the experience of  time 
certainly belongs to Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative, an oeuvre that will be essential 
for the development of  this thesis. According to his critique, the virtuous circle that 
allows time to be experienced through narrative (and viceversa) its precisely the 
dynamic which enables historiography to establish its scientific structure from its 
narrative nature. Therefore, if  historiography can aim to an epistemological 
establishment only by facing its sub-lunar essence, that is its inherent necessity for 
interpretation and representation, we are asked to figure out how this sub-lunar status 
could be improved into a new global community in order to become historical. Hence, 
the first part of  this research will analyze precisely the substratum of  different 
narratives involved in this process, trying to define the difficult relationship between 
personal narrative, intended as the set of  of  discourses, testimonies and memories of  
the individual, and the Grand Narratives, the system of  dominant discourses which 
have defined science, historiography and culture all over the human history. 
1.2  Personal Narratives and Grand Narratives : a lost relationship 
In his short essay entitled Experience and Poverty, Walter Benjamin seems to be 
discussing the annihilated relationship between the value of  personal experience and 
the actualization of  contemporaneity.  What the most of  the scholars defined clear 
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about this essay is the evident critique against the current emptiness of  Grand 
Narratives:  
“Moreover, everyone knew precisely what experience was: older people had 
always passed it onto younger ones. It was handed down in short forms to sons 
and grandsons, with the authority of  age, in proverbs; with an ofter long-
winded eloquence, as tales; sometimes as stories form the foreign lands, at the 
fireside. —Where has it all gone? Who still meets people who really know how 
to tell a story? Where do you still hear words from the dying that last, and that 
pass from a generation to the next like a precious ring? Who can still call on a 
proverb when he needs one? And Who will ever attempt to deal with young 
people by giving them the benefit of  their experiences? ” 2
It is necessary to stress that the apparently evidence of  a discourse against the 
Grand Narratives, intended in their strictly post-modern sense, could not be so evident 
and univocal. While is clear that, through this dense and somewhere cryptic text, 
emerges suddenly the strong critique against the Grand Narratives intended as the 
matrix of  a culture that is now experienced as “ a surfeit that it has exhausted them 
[the people]”, to which Benjamin hopes the coming of  a narrative that will “leave no 
traces ”, is less clear the reason why his critique is starting from the direct experience 3
of  the individual rather than, as Lyotard did, from the inherent contradiction that 
those narratives were carrying.  
Whereas Lyotard, in his famous essay The Postmodern Condition: a report on Knowledge is 
translating master systems, like modern science, into what it defines properly a 
discourse, Benjamin is operating the other way around: what he depicts like a master 
narrative is instead the simplest act of  communication, namely, the communication of  
an experience.  Why is this inversion so important for our research?  
As long as our purpose is, at least at the beginning, the one of  understanding why 
an hypothetical global community is without an own narrative, this inversion could 
help us in order to understand whether this community is still subjected to the grand 
narratives of  late capitalism, or rather annihilated by the fundamental mistrust in the 
 W. Benjamin, “Experience and Poverty,” Selected Writings Volume 2, Translated by Ronnie Livingstone, The Belknap 2
Press of  Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 1999,  p.731
 Ibidem, p. 7323
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act of  communication, namely, the intersubjective communication of  an experience. 
The two faces of  this dilemma are literally calling for a resolution or a reunification: 
on the one hand, we have the controlling presence of  capitalist, colonialist and 
scientific discourses which could not fit anymore with the skeptical opposition of  
minor  (sometimes literally “personal”) narratives; on the other, we have the 
impoverishment of  singular experience intended as the matrix for a shared narrative 
which is currently been replaced by the major ones. Probably this distinction will result 
at the end univocal, perhaps strictly dialectical, to the extent that any major narratives 
is not only created and manipulated by a system of  power, but also lived and 
experienced by the individual. What is clear for our purpose is that the very meaning 
of  narrative must be put at stake: we are not looking only for a present description of  a 
global narrative, but above all for a deontological definition of  a narrative that is still 
in progress, that still has to come.  
If  we attempt a work of  reunification of  those two sides of  the problem, we have to 
consider that Benjamin’s and Lyotard’s critiques are also separated by a broad 
epistemological distance.  
In Lyotard’s critique, scientific discourses, that are being demonstrated to be 
inherently narrative, cannot totally achieve the purported status of  truth, a truth that 
can be univocally and naturally stated without the necessary moment of  acceptation 
by a public audience. What Benjamin is being arguing seems to precede this structural 
differentiation between scientific and narrative discourse: why a narration is not able 
to be scientific anymore? That is, why the audience, the addressee of  any personal 
narration, is unable to receive a story as an argument of  truth? Has Narrative ever 
reached a scientific status? 
This ultimate gap reveals that is possible to conceive science and narrative as two 
different epistemologies (in which one results, at the end, subjected by the other), or as 
two complementary discourses that are meant to sustain each other in order to make 
possible any statement of  truth. 
In order to reveal the apparent conflict that defines the relationship between 
narrative and science, which would be better to be distinguished in terms of  fictional 
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and non-fictional discourses, I am going to read this opposition in light of  Paul Ricoeur’s 
analysis developed in the first volume of  Time and Narrative.  
It is particularly interesting to define the core of  this extraordinary oeuvre by using 
a term developed by Nikita Nankov in his article entitled The Narrative of  Ricoeur’s Time 
and Narrative . He called Ricoeur’s approach a philosophical ‘credulous incredulity’: the 4
first term refers to the massive and precise synopsis of  philosophical and historical 
movements that, before him, have signed the debate around the narrative nature of  
historiography;  the second term stresses instead a specific suspicion about the action 
of  intellectual repetition based on the previous act of  reviewing, that inherently calls 
for a subversion or reinterpretation of  these theories.  
This credulous incredulity is important for us in two senses : first, because we are 
trying to read the incredulities of  Lyotard and Benjamin in light of  another incredulity 
that could lead us to master the problem; second, because exactly by mastering the 
final problem we might find us in a position of  incredulity, or dissatisfaction, toward 
Ricoeur’s analysis. 
1.3 Time, therefore Narrative: phenomenological and cosmological 
narratives 
The theoretical apparatus of  Time and Narrative is based on a double initial move 
that looks for both the conceptual foundation of  time and narrative in two different 
authors.  For what it concerns the topic of  time, Ricoeur reclaims Saint Augustine’s 
philosophy to be the only one capable of  problematizing two separate and 
complementary aspects of  time, namely the phenomenological and the cosmological, 
through which emerge the unavoidable difficulty of  representing time in language: 
here Ricoeur’s analysis of  the aporias of  time result fundamental for his research. On 
the other hand, he considers Aristotle’s philosophy of  Poetics as the most appropriate 
thought for the definition of  the interaction between real experience (in that case, 
 Nikita Nankov, The Narrative of  Ricoeur’s Narrative and Time, The Comparatist, vol. 38, October 2014, pp. 4
227-249
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experience of  time) and the constitution of  a text. As we know, Aristotle’s Poetic is  a 
treatise on the plot production in the ancient Greek theatre, from which Ricoeur 
extrapolates the dynamic of  mimesis with the aim of  universalizing this concept for all 
the narrative production.  
1) For time is treated as the beginning of  the oeuvre, we should follow the text logic 
structure and explain how Saint Augustine’s philosophy enables Ricoeur analysis of  
time, an analysis addressed to the identification of  three majors aporias that make the 
interaction between time and narrative problematic. 
All the process of  self-investigation developed in Confessions is an attempt to find a 
convergence between idealistic and sceptic notions of  time: on the one hand, time is 
the aristotelian structure of  the universe which depends on the eternal fact that “there 
are stars and other lights in the sky, set there to be portents, and be the measures of  
time, to mark out the day and the year ”. This divine eternity is opposed to the 5
chronological experience of  human being, divided in past, present and future, which is 
the only one that can be named ‘time’. This aspect, properly phenomenological 
(opposed to eternal cosmological), defines simultaneously the two first aporias: the one 
that cannot define a univocal - but a double - essence of  time, and the one that 
declares possible a phenomenological experience of  past (things that are no more) 
present (things that are passing by) and future (things that are not yet). The third 
aporia, finally, ask whether is possible to escape “the ultimate unrepresentability of  
time ”. 6
2) Aristotle’s Poetic could be considered a deontological argument on the production 
of  plot, intended as the founding element of  intersubjective communication into the 
Greek tragedies and comedies. This art of  the ‘emplotment’ lies, for Ricoeur, in a 
three-folded application of  mimesis ( misesis1- mimesis2 - mimesis3).  Mimesis1 
indicates the primal field of  human acting , which is always already prefigured with 
certain basic competencies: for example, competency in the conceptual network of  the 
 Saint Augustine, Confessions, Translated by R. Pine-Coffin, edited by Penguin Classics, Penguin UK 2003, p. 5
271 (paragraph 23) 
 Ibidem, p. 279 (paragraph 28)6
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semantics of  action (expressed in the ability to raise questions of  who, how, why, with 
whom, against whom, etc.); in the use of  symbols (being able to grasp one thing as 
standing for something else); and competency in the temporal structures governing the 
syntagmatic order of  narration (the "followability" of  a narrative). Mimesis2 concerns 
narrative "emplotment." Ricoeur describes this level as "the kingdom of  the as if" 
Narrative emplotment brings the diverse elements of  a situation into an imaginative 
order, in just the same way as does the plot of  a story. Emplotment here has a 
mediating function. It configures events, agents and objects and renders those 
individual elements meaningful as part of  a larger whole in which each takes a place 
in the network that constitutes the narrative's response to why, how, who, where, when, 
etc. By bringing together heterogeneous factors into its syntactical order emplotment 
creates a "concordant discordance," a tensive unity which functions as a redescription 
of  a situation in which the internal coherence of  the constitutive elements endows 
them with an explanatory role. Mimesis3 concerns the integration of  the imaginative or 
"fictive" perspective offered at the level of  mimesis2 into actual, lived experience. 
Ricoeur's model for this is a phenomenology of  reading, which he describes as "the 
intersection of  the world of  the text and the world of  the reader ". Not only are our 7
life stories "written," they must be "read," and when they are read they are taken as 
one's own and integrated into one's identity and self-understanding. Mimesis3 effects 
the integration of  the hypothetical to the real by anchoring the time depicted (or 
recollected or imputed) in a dated "now" and "then" of  actual, lived time.  It is 
precisely through this circular dynamic that the virtuous cycle of  time and narrative is 
enacted: “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative 
mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of  temporal 
existence ”. 8
 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Volume 1, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin, David Pellauer,,University of  7
Chicago Press, 2012, p. 71
 Ibidem p. 528
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The inherent connection between time and narrative is given by the possibility of  
resolving the aporias of  time by a narrative reconfiguration. The attempt to resolve the 
second aporia, the one that concerns the three ecstasis of  time, becomes relevant for 
the distinction  between fictional and historical narrative. According to Ricoeur, 
whereas fictional narrative can sublimate the magmatic interpenetration of  past, 
present and future by the configuration of  a story that is not necessarily tied to a 
consequential line of  events, historiography has to invent a medium-time between the 
phenomenological experience of  humankind and the cosmological eternity of  non-
human time. This time, namely the historical, “transposes in a practical way and on 
the dialogical level of  a common history the phenomenological meditation that is 
speculative and on a monological level ”. Nevertheless, this possibility can be obtained 9
at the price of  sacrificing the natural plurality of  the plot, by replacing the multiple 
narration with a collective singular, that literally “stands for” the multitude of  
individual experiences. Here arises the mythical figure of  the historian, the one who is 
asked to guarantee both the explanatory and the understandable feature of  history, the 
one who act as a judge in a court to determine what, in the infinite field of  the past, is 
allowed to belong to history. Therefore, the historian distinguishes himself  from the 
fictional author for the extent that the author is free to locate himself  in all the three 
ecstasis, whereas the historian can only refer to a past experienced from its future 
(namely, from the present of  the historian). Hence, whereas the author can only refer 
to phenomenological time of  experience, the historian deals with a dangerous business 
that makes though the mediation between phenomenological and cosmological time: 
“The final consequence is that there is no historv of  the present, in the strictly 
narrative sense of  that term. Such a thing could be only, an anticipation of  
what future historians might write about us. The symmetry between expla- 
nation and prediction, characteristic of  the nomological sciences, is broken at 
the very level of  historical statements. If  such narration of  the present could be 
written and known to us, we could in turn falsify it by doing the opposite of  
what it predicts. We do not know at all what future historians might write 
about us. Not only do we not know what events will occur, we do not know 
which ones will be taken as important. We would have to foresee the interests 
Nikita Nankov, The Narrative of  Ricoeur’s Narrative and Time, p. 2389
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of  future historians to foresee under what descriptions they will place our 
actions. Peirce's assertion "the future is open" means "no one has written 'the 
history of  the present." This latter remark brings us back to our starting point, 
the internal limit of  narrative statements ”  10
 Once given this perspective, Lyotard’s and Benjamin’s positions assume a different 
connotation. We argued that both the philosophers claimed against the possibility of  
narratives to be valuable for the individual configuration of  reality: while the first one 
attacks the Grand Narratives, intended as the major dispositive of  dominant cultures’ 
perpetration, the second expresses the inherent impossibility for an individual 
narrative to reach the status of  truth, which could enable personal experience to 
become valuable into an intersubjective relation.  What we can unveil, through a 
comparation with Ricoeur's analysis, is how these two perspectives are inherently 
supposing the impossibility to “make the present historical”. Before discussing this 
possibility, which is inherently related to the epistemological value of  Tellhistory, it 
would be useful to develop a short insight into the “history of  present”, a concept that 
found up an intriguing explanation into Foucault’s early genealogy.  
1.4 History of  the present 
In the preface of  Philosophy of  Right, Hegel wrote one the passages fated to become 
monumental within the field of  philosophy of  history: 
One more word about teaching what the world ought to be: Philosophy always 
arrives too late to do any such teaching. As the thought of  the world, philosophy 
appears only in the period after actuality has been achieved and has completed its 
formative process. The lesson of  the concept, which necessarily is also taught by 
history, is that only in the ripeness of  actuality does the ideal appear over against 
the real, and that only then does this ideal comprehend this same real world in its 
substance and build it up for itself  into the configuration of  an intellectual realm. 
When philosophy paints its gray in gray, then a configuration of  life has grown old, 
 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Volume 1, p. 14710
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and cannot be rejuvenated by this gray in gray, but only understood; the Owl of  
Minerva takes flight only as the dusk begins to fall.  11
The metaphor of  the Owl of  Minerva refers directly to the episteme of  philosophy, 
by implicitly addressing the status of  any historical discourse which necessarily 
precedes the birth of  any philosophical system. For philosophy is also the reflection on 
the facts of  history, therefore the reflection on the very possibility to build any 
historical discourse, history itself  must be taken as “something given”, as a datum 
previously stabilized by the framework of  historiography. Following Hegel, philosophy 
is condemned into a perpetual delay, the same delay which separates the living, 
evolutive process of  history (namely, history of  the present) from its  theoretical 
translation into a discourse of  history, namely historiography. This schema is 
unavoidable until philosophy of  history keep on questioning history as a line which 
goes from a point in the past towards a final point in the present. Within the sphere of  
modern thinking, only a particular theory had been able to contrast and criticize this 
approach by discussing its fundamental process: the creation of  an “origin”. 
The theory that we are summoning is the one of  genealogy, originally developed by 
Nietzsche and subsequently reinterpreted by Michel Foucault. Firstly, it must be 
pointed that genealogy is not an alternative to historiography intended as the proper 
registration of  historical facts; instead, it questions the epistemological fundament of  
historiography by criticizing the claim for both an evolutive and a marxist 
interpretation of  the human history. That means that, at least in Nietzsche’s theory, 
the role of  contingency framed by the evolutive and marxist theories do not take 
account of  the infinite field of  possibility that are given in every historical process. 
Furthermore, genealogy sides more on the hermeneutic necessity for reading history 
rather than on the teleologic habit for writing history. According to what Foucault wrote 
on his Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, “genealogy does not oppose itself  to history as the 
lofty and profound gaze of  the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective 
 F. Hegel, preface to Philosophy of  Right,Oxford University Press; First Published: by Clarendon Press 1952, 11
Translated: with Notes by T M Knox 1942, p. VIII
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of  the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the meta-historical deployment of  ideal 
significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself  to the search for ‘origins’ “. 12
The precise opposition to teleology is also what constitutes the possibility for a 
simultaneity of  philosophy and historiography in the common field of  an history of  the 
present.  
This term opens up the opportunity for a wide deployment, especially after our 
attempt to find up a breach in which the grand narratives and the personal narratives 
could cooperate in framing a global history of  the present. Nevertheless, we should 
first analyze what history of  the present means for the French philosopher who 
originally invented this field.  
The definition of  a ‘‘history of  the present’’ sounds unavoidably provocative, and 
furthermore absolutely paradoxical. To those who are not confident with Foucault’s 
theories, this idea risks to suggest a form of  “presentism”: a kind of  historical writing 
that approaches the past using the concepts and concerns of  the present. Indeed, for 
canonic historiography this approach would achieve the highest degree of  shame, 
namely the shame of  anachronism,  inasmuch as it projects contemporary values and 
meanings onto a past that may have been constituted quite differently. 
As David Garland has stated in his essay What is a ‘‘history of  the present’’? On Foucault’s 
genealogies and their critical preconditions, a first gaze must be directed towards the two 
majors methodologies employed by Foucault himself  during two different periods: 
these are archeology and genealogy.  The archeological model, despite its revolutionary 
approach, can be inscribed into a major current represented by scholars like Louis 
Althusser, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilheim, whose work was structurally 
focused on the “break”, that is on the rupture moment which caused the 
transformation of  any given social system. Therefore, the archeological method 
represented a primal inquiry which “digs down into the past, uncovering the discursive 
traces of  distinct historical periods and re-assembling them, like so many distinct layers 
 M. Foucault,Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in Language, Counter-memory, edited by D.F. Bouchard, Itaca, Cornel 12
University Press 1977, p. 140
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or strata, each one exhibiting its own structured pattern of  statements, its own order 
of  discourse ”.  13
As already suggested, this model tried to highlight those moment of  discontinuity 
between the emergence or overlap of  two different orders of  discourse, in order to 
show, exactly like psychoanalysis does,  how the inherent conflict of  ‘narratives’ shaped 
the representation of  history in the present: “My problem is essentially the definition 
of  the implicit systems in which we find ourselves prisoners: what I would like to grasp 
is the system of  limits and exclusion which we practice without knowing it; I would 
like to make the cultural unconscious apparent ”.  14
The intention which, after the publication of  Discipline and Punish in 1977, sustains 
the elaboration of  a contemporary genealogy, despite its sense of  continuity with the 
archeological model, opposes the very research of  the origin pursued by archeology: “I 
was interested in [the subjects of  his archaeologies] because I saw in them ways of  
thinking and behaving that are still with us. I try to show, based upon their historical 
establishment and formation, those systems that are still ours today, and within which 
we are trapped. It is a question, basically, of  presenting a critique of  our own time, 
based upon retrospective analyses ”. 15
Precisely in this act of  questioning our own times lies the specificity of  the history 
of  the present, a present in which the dominance of  traditional discourses (which we 
can easily translate with the name of  Grand Narratives) must be highlighted and 
criticized according to the contextual variances:”What is present reality? What is the 
present field of  our experiences? Here it is not a question of  the analytic of  truth but 
involves what could be called an ontology of  the present, of  present reality, an 
ontology of  modernity, an ontology of  ourselves ”. 16
 D. Garland, What is a ‘‘history of  the present’’? On Foucault’s genealogies and their critical preconditions, in Punishment & 13
Society, Vol. 16(4) 365–384, New York University 2015, p.369
 M. Foucault in A conversation with Michel Foucault by J.K Simon, Partisan Review 38(2), 1971, p. 19614
 Ibid. p. 19215
  M. Foucault,The Government of  Self  and Others (Lectures at the College deFrance 1982–1983). New York: 16
Palgrave, p. 21
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By applying this particular model, the narrative status of  historiography is once 
again pinpointed: as long as it is a narration, namely a narration enacted in the 
present, past itself  proves itself  to be a product of  its own product, namely the present. 
Yet, it could be questionable the status which the genealogical model covers in the 
distinction between the personal and the grand narrative: is it really capable to 
transcend this conflictual dimension? 
For history is criticized for its normative and regulative function upon the 
individual, someone would be tempted to see in the genealogical model an attempt to 
unify the abyss between individual and major narratives. Furthermore, it is absolutely 
remarkable how genealogy was able to relate the text of  history with the object of  
history, in an horizon in which facts and interpretation were indissolubly connected in 
the major area of  the discourse. Being the writing of  history also a content among the 
contents of  history, Foucault’s position closely resembles the one of  Frank Ankersmit, 
who discussed the interrelation of  factual truth and fictive sense using psychoanalysis 
as the perfect instance of  this relation:  
“Psychoanalysis recites the novel a person has created of  his own life but, however 
much distorted that novel may be, it is truth itself  as well, without being, as in the 
novel, merely an expression of  it. It is the novel of  our life-history and the history 
of  the novel of  our lives. Psychoanalysis is able to achieve this synthesis because - in 
contrast with historiography and the novel -it does not generate the dichotomy or 
doubling the spoken word and what the spoken word is about. On the contrary, 
psychoanalysis aims at precisely the elimination of  that dichotomy ” 17
Once the identity of  the spoken word (historiography) and what the spoken word is 
about (history) is intertwined trough the genealogical approach, a new problem arises. 
We can argue that this problem is inherently related with a wider discipline which has 
been subliminally involved since the beginning of  our research. Speaking  of  the 
irreconcilable distance between individual and grand narrative, following the 
discussion toward the problematization of  an history of  the present, we have always 
maintained, with the legitimacy of  the authors quoted, a strict hermeneutical 
 F. Ankersmit,Wahrheit in Literatur und Geschichte ", published in: Geschichstdiskurs. Band 5: Globale Konflikte, 17
Erinnerungsarbeit und Neuorientierungen seit 1945 , Wolfgang Küttler, Jörn Rüsen, Ernst Schulin Hrsgb. Frankfurt am 
Main : Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag , 1999, p. 10
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approach. For hermeneutics is the discipline which inquiries the capacity and the 
legitimacy of  any interpretation of  texts, speeches, utterances and more generally 
theories,  this approach is originally condemned to follow the decay of  the event in the 
same way in which Minerva’s owl flies toward the sunset. When we questioned 
Lyotard’s and Benjamin’s analyses, we where examining the conflictual modality of  
historical writing upon the subjects’ experience; in order to disentangle this problem 
we considered, following Ricoeur’s main oeuvre, that any narrative presupposes a 
moment of  reading in which the moment of  writing is experienced by the individual; 
finally, we problematized the possibility to experience history during its very 
formation, namely in its present development, arguing that the distance between the 
fact and the discourse must be considered under the same critical light.  
Nevertheless, we can prove the last point to be far from being reached in our 
discussion. As we already stated, we maintained an hermeneutical approach which, at 
the end, turns out to be the the fundamental limit of  our research. That means that 
until we are entangled into an hermeneutical research, we are mechanically forced to 
produce a higher, or more general, interpretation of  any given theory. By considering 
the position that we described for the genealogical (or the psychoanalytical) model, we 
pinpointed the necessity to achieve a conjunction between the sphere of  facts and 
experiences with the field of  narration and discourse; yet, by achieving this 
perspective, we also generated an higher interpretation which unavoidably covers the 
intellectually position of  a dominant narrative.    
In the second chapter, we will try to prove the limit of  the hermeneutical reading 
into the sphere of  media communication, focusing on the epistemological differences 
given by a theory of  text, which implies both the acts of  writing and reading, against a 
possible theory of  the voice, in which other operations could eventually lead us toward 
a new theorization of  an history of  the present.  
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The Voice 
                                                         Chapter Two 
II.1  Introduction 
We concluded the first paragraph of  this thesis by addressing what peculiarly seems 
to us the core problem of  our research: in order to determine the nature of  the 
narrative which sustain Tellhistory, we pointed out the necessity to found this narrative 
on a medium which must differ from the text. 
Indeed, Tellhistory is already involved in the development of  an oral medium which 
minimally implies the presence of  a description in form of  written text. Yet, our 
analysis of  the oral medium will not attempt to justify the method but rather to test the 
limits of  the same in order to explore all the possibilities which Tellhistory could 
eventually open up within the field of  global historiography.   
Given the nature of  this discussion, which implies a double research on new 
historiography and on media theory, the following chapter will be developing two 
different treads: the first will analyze the relationship between orality and new media, 
mostly employing the fundamental researches pursued by the School of  Chicago 
scholars’ like McCluhan and Walter Ong, with the additional intent to discover new 
entailments of  their theories within the parallel world of  social media; the second will 
be looking for a position into the larger, but unfortunately not very popular, field of  
oral history, with the precise intent not only of  highlighting the similarities with the 
structure of  Tellhistory, but especially by pinpointing the differences between the oral-
historical research and the program invented by Tellhistory itself.  
Nevertheless, both the approaches require a preliminary insight into  the specific 
concept of  voice. Indeed, the concept of  voice could be examined by different 
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disciplines according to different research exigences: a wide literature was developed in 
the field of  paleoanthropology, where a particular attention was payed to the cultural 
shift from orality to writing in primitive societies, and indeed linguistic has covered 
since the beginning of  XX century the largest part of  discussion about the interaction 
between orality and text.  
Yet, given our theoretical need for a significant definition of  the concept “voice”, 
namely a definition which could give the dimension of  the capacity of  constituting 
original meanings through the use of  voice, we will introduce the discussion with a 
brief  synopsis on the role covered by voice in philosophy, especially referring to 
particular theories emerged from phenomenology, structuralism and post-
structuralism.    
II.2 Voice in phenomenology and structuralism 
The inquiry on the concept of  voice has covered different interesting positions 
trough the developments of  phenomenology and structuralism, two philosophical 
disciplines which constantly absorbed and reinterpreted the elements of  one another, 
in a way that they seem mutually permeated, especially for what concerns the topic of  
language. 
In this way, Husserl’s analysis can be elected as the original point from which 
phenomenology and structuralism initiated the debate on the differences between 
spoken and written language. Nevertheless, husserlian phenomenology is born with 
the aim of  contrasting the emerging relativism promoted by both marxism and 
psychoanalysis, intentionally looking for an a-priori feature which could ensure any 
form of  empirical knowledge of  the world, and thereby establishing a privileged 
position for human rationality as a foundation for objective knowledge, which by 
extension may be left open to the metaphysical. Husserl’s transcendental idealism 
challenged the more canonic form of  Platonic idealism by producing a dimension in 
which the metaphysical a-priori poses itself  in the contingent context of  reality, refusing 
in this way the absolute distinction argued by the Greek philosopher. No longer does 
the Ideal exist exterior to temporal and spatial forms, but interweaves with the 
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temporal and spatial. Yet, the meaning intended as universal’s expression remain 
separated from the human subjectivity in the act of  embodiment within the world. 
The role played by language in this process of  meeting between the physical and the 
metaphysical is firstly explained in the first of  the six Investigations.  
Here Husserl separates and defines what he calls expression and indicative speech 
(ß1-ß8). Anticipating what Saussure called signifiers, indications are those signs that bring 
comunicative intention from a subject to another, literally those marks which carry 
means able to be perceived, transmitted and received. The core difference which 
distinguish indications from expressions is that an expression does not necessarily 
convey meaning; it simply exists in the mind like a sensation or visual image without a 
name or description. To simplify the distinction, it would not be naive to understand 
expressions as the Platonic Ideal form, while seeing in the indication the embodiment 
of  the same Ideal form. As such, indications are arbitrary and meaningless in and of  
themselves. What makes communication possible begins precisely in the constitution 
of  “sense”, namely the act in which the indication meets the world by converging in a 
context in which the word explains itself. He writes:  
The articulate sound-complex, the written sign, etc., first becomes a spoken word or 
communicative bit of  speech, when a speaker produces it with the intention of  
ìexpressing himself  about somethingî through its means; he must endow it 
with a sense in certain acts of  mind, a sense he desires to share with his 
auditors. Such sharing becomes a possibility if  the auditor also understands 
the speakerís intention. He does this inasmuch as he takes the speaker to be a 
person who is not merely uttering sounds but speaking to him, who is 
accompanying those sounds with certain sense-giving acts which the sounds 
reveal to the hearer, or whose sense they seek to communicate to him. What 
first makes mental commerce possible, and turns connected speech into 
discourse, lies in the correlation among the corresponding physical and mental 
experiences of  communicating persons which is effected by the physical side 
of  speech. Speaking and hearing, intimation of  mental states through 
speaking and reception thereof  in hearing, are mutually correlated .  18
 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations. Translated by J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 18
1968, p. 7
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For this passage remains one of  the most explicit for what concerns the voice, the 
rest of  Husserl’s production considers language in its general presence. Nevertheless, 
this passage pinpoints a feature which will become fundamental in Heidegger’s 
philosophy, in which it will cover a position that literally exceeds the limit of  language 
as communication,  irremediably separating the phenomenological analysis from the 
structuralist. Heidegger considers fundamental the Husserlian consideration according 
to which any speech acquires the faculty of  communication in the act of  a subjective 
embodiment. Rather, in vocal discourse the sounds and vibrations of  phonation fall 
outside of  both signification and materiality, and allude to what withdraws and hides. 
One cannot appeal to a metaphysical-technological explanation because the phūsis of  
spoken language retreats from analysis. When Heidegger affirms that ‘Language is the 
flower of  the mouth’ (OWL 99), he means to situate nonrepresentational language 
within a region of  being that negotiates the interstices of  the body and the world. As 
he writes,  
The sounding of  the voice is then no longer only of  the order of  physical organs. It 
is released now from the perspective of  the physiological-physical explanation in 
terms of  purely phonetic data. The sound of  language, its earthiness, is held with 
the harmony that attunes the regions of  the world’s structure, playing them in 
chorus.   19
Still within the evolution of  phenomenological thinking, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
words are not representations of  thought; words are thought, and thought does not 
exist exterior to or separate from the elements used to bring it into fulfillment. […] 
In terms of  embodiment, Merleau-Ponty also credits the spoken word with 
inhabiting a physical space that is inseparable from the physical body : our 
physiognomy delimits phonetic properties, and we learn words as we learn to 
pronounce them aloud, putting our vocal apparatus in motion. Words are not images 
that exist separate from the actual instance of  usage in either thinking or speaking. 
Likewise our physical expressiveness fills out the meanings aimed at by our linguistic 
 M. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, translated by Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper and Row, 19
Publishers, 1971, p. 101
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utterances. Corroborating Husserl’s view of  speech transpiring as an embodied 
activity, Merleau-Ponty states,  
The spoken word is significant not only through the medium of  individual words, 
but also through that of  accent, intonation, gesture, and facial expression, and, . . . 
as these additional meanings no longer reveal the speaker’s thoughts but the source 
of  his thoughts and his fundamental manner of  being .   20
On the other hand, despite the original similarity in the analysis of  language, post-
structuralism achieved a perspective diametrically opposed for what it concerns the 
evaluation of  spoken language. As Andrew McComb Kimbrough stated in his 
dissertation the Sound of  Meaning: Theories of  Voice in Twenty-century Thought and 
Performance , post-structuralism contributed to a progressive impoverishment of  21
spoken language. Whereas phenomenology, with the new impulse given by the 
evaluation of  the bodily presence, has interpreted vocal language as a tool able to give 
sense to the frame of  grammatical language, post-structuralism considered the 
arbitrary and subjective sphere of  vocal language to be subjected to the dominance of  
psychological and social rules.  
Hence, despite Saussure interpretation of  spoken language as “the seeds of  every 
change, each one being pioneered in the first instance by a certain number of  
individuals before entering into general usage ”, the pupil Claude Levi-Strauss, in his 22
oeuvre Structural Anthropology , argues that  linguistic frame works “beyond the 
consciousness of  the individual, imposing upon his thought conceptual schemes which 
are taken as objective categories ”. Despite the philosophical tradition considers Levi-23
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!26
Strauss thought to be strictly structuralist, this analysis links him directly to the wide 
area of  post-structuralism and critical theory which engaged the study of  the subject 
as entangled into the unescapable relationship of  dominant powers. Once given this 
essential outline of  the opposition between phenomenological and structuralist model, 
it must be somehow relevant the intuitive analogy which emerge from the discussion 
developed in Chapter I.  
Once again, this time by approaching the particular topic of  vocal language, we are 
forced to face the evident opposition between the possibility to let the subjective 
narrative emerge from the personal speech, or rather to interpret the personal speech 
as one of  the infinite variants within the sphere of  a major narrative, in this case 
language itself  (intended as a dominant frame). 
As long as we have to evaluate the possibility of  creating new meanings by the 
narration through the use of  voice, the circular problem of  narratives will constantly 
present itself. Hence, it could be useful to compare two different traditional position 
which have given interesting insight on the value of  orality, especially for their 
apparent theoretical opposition: the  theory of  phonocentrism and the theory of  secondary 
orality.  
II.3 Phonocentrism and Secondary Orality 
The opposition between phonocentrism and secondary orality might not appear so 
direct and evident as we are attempting to argue. Indeed, these theories seem to 
converge in the idea that orality, following the importance originally stated by Saussure 
himself, sustains all the linguistic apparatus, being it simultaneously the origin and the 
main reality of  language itself. 
Nevertheless, intentions and outcomes of  these theories prove the distance which 
separates Derrida’s critique from Ong’s analysis. Already in the choice of  words, 
critique and analysis, we are giving a general clue for deciphering the immense distance 
which distinguishes such similar thoughts. 
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According to Spivack, Derrida’s notion of  phonocentrism challenges directly both the 
ideas of  the centrality of  speech in Saussure’s structuralism and, simultaneously, the 
Heideggerian existentialism which implements Being and presence:  
In the Grammatology Derrida suggests that this rejection of  writing as an appendage, 
a mere technique, and yet a menace built into speech - in effect, a scapegoat - is a 
symptom of  a much broader tendency. He relates this phonocentrism to logocentrism 
— the belief  that the first and last things are the Logos, the Word, the Divine 
Mind, the infinite understanding of  God, an infinitely creative subjectivity, and, 
closer to our time, the self-presence of  full self-consciousness. In the Grammatology 
and elsewhere, Derrida argues that the evidence for this originary and teleologic 
presence has customarily been found in the voice, the phonè.   24
The tradition assaulted by Derrida has considered the voice to be the tangible 
material which gives sense to the otherwise meaningless frame of  language. In a 
particular passage of  Grammatology, Derrida pushes the critique started from 
phonocentrism (relating it to the broader sense of  logocentrism) towards an essential 
critique of  centrism itself, namely the pursuit of  any origin or paradigm which could 
signify the totality of  the system: 
the notion of  the sign…remains therefore within the heritage of  that logocentrism 
which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of  voice and being, of  voice and 
meaning of  being, of  voice and ideality of  meaning…One already has a 
premonition that phonocentrism gets mixed up with the historical determination 
of  the meaning of  being in general as presence, with all the sub-determinations 
which depend on this general form […] Logocentrism would thus be solidary with 
determination of  the being of  the entity as presence.  25
It is precisely in this pursuit of  an alternative to any possible centrism that this 
inversion of  hierarchy acquires a totalizing meaning within Derrida's critique. 
Therefore the frame of  writing must not be interpreted as merely signal codification, 
 G.C. Spivak, Translator’s Preface in J. Derrida Of  Grammatology,, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, John 24
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but rather as the field in which the difference takes place, namely the place in which 
every monotheism (the one of  God, of  the Author, of  the Self) is constantly 
undermined and put at stake. The greatest challenge of  deconstruction lies exactly in 
declaring the text to be the absolute non-central paradigm of  reality, by creating, in a 
sense celebrating and contrasting master Heidegger, a metaphysic of  non presence, of  
perpetual alterity.  
Assuming the risk of  oversimplifying Derrida’s theory, we must point out the 
outcome of  this thesis from the perspective of  voice.  One of  the core sentences of  
Grammatology , probably the most misunderstood and still the most popular, says Il n’y a 
pas de hors-text (there is not out-text). In his attempt to destabilize any univocal thought, 
Derrida extended the area of  writing beyond the boundaries of  language itself, in 
order to account the possibility that language itself  has to create relationship based on 
the production of  difference. We must deduce that voice becomes a corollary of  
writing in which the traditional identity with being/presence is refused. Hence, what is 
the role of  orality within Derrida’s Grammatology? What does the interaction of  
writing and speech produce?  
Whether an interaction between the claim for presence of  speech and the constant 
alterity of  writing exists or not, we should firstly question the theory which 
traditionally faced Derrida’s analysis, despite its structural difference given by its socio-
anthropological approach. As we already stated, both Derrida’s deconstruction and 
School of  Chicago’s analysis depart from the consideration that speech has always 
played the most fundamental role. Nevertheless, the model differently elaborated by 
McLuhan and Ong followed a tread which considers language to be like a material, 
therefore an object which effectively interacts with human senses, rather than like the 
pure system of  signification represented by the French philosopher.  
In The Gutenberg Galaxy, Marshall McLuhan has discussed the linguistic evolution of  
Western societies by relating linguistic structures with a phenomenological study of  
human perception. From this perspective, pre-literate societies were defined by a 
solipsistic integration of  the individual with his environment, which was experienced 
especially by his auditive perception, for his constant necessity to memorize, listen, 
!29
understand and perform the formulas of  a language freed by the technology of  
writing. On the contrary, literary societies, especially those based on a high-level 
development of  communication, perceive the world in terms of  spatio-temporality by 
a perspective which is almost exclusively experienced by sight. This diametrical 
contrast plays in McLuhan's analysis the role of  fundamental discriminant able to 
explain every apparent opposition between aural (or oral) societies and visual (or 
literary) societies. Therefore, each technology enhances different levels of  sensitive 
perception:  
If  a technology is introduced either from within or from without a culture, and if  it 
gives new stress or ascendancy to one or another of  our senses, the ratio among all 
of  our senses is altered. We no longer feel the same, nor do our eyes and ears and 
other senses remain the same. The interplay among our senses is perpetual save in 
conditions of  anesthesia. But any sense when stepped up to high intensity can act 
as an anesthetic for other senses. The dentist can now use "audiac"—induced noise
—to remove tactility. Hypnosis depends on the same principle of  isolating one 
sense in order to anesthetize the others. The result is a break in the ratio among the 
senses, a kind of  loss of  identity. Tribal, non-literate man, living under the intense 
stress on auditory organization of  all experience, is, as it were, entranced . 26
This principle of  technologic affection recalls Rousseau’s critique of  language and 
arts, pointing out all the consequences which any technical development implies:  
The role played by print in instituting new patterns of  culture is not unfamiliar. But 
one natural consequence of  the specializing action of  the new forms of  knowledge 
was that all kinds of  power took on a strongly centralist character. Whereas the role 
of  the feudal monarch had been inclusive, the king actually including in himself  all 
his subjects, the Renaissance prince tended to become an exclusive power centre 
surrounded by his individual subjects. And the result of  such centralism, itself  
dependent on many new developments in roads and commerce, was the habit of  
delegation of  powers and the specializing of  many functions in separate areas and 
individuals . 27
 M. McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, The Making of  The Typographic Man, University of  Toronto Press, 26
Toronto 1962, p. 24
 Ibidem, p. 1027
!30
Clearly one of  the the most important theoretical challenge consists, for Derrida 
and McLuhan, in stating how the mutual objects of  critique has contributed to the 
creation of  centrism/centralism, namely how the limit of  subjectivity emerged from a 
particular inclination of  human progress. This conceptual knot is particularly relevant 
for our discussion, as long as our purpose remains that of  understanding how the voice 
could enable a new perspective on history, namely an history of  the present. Can 
therefore the notion of  centrism be determinant for our purpose? In other words, to 
what extent the centrality ( or rather the alterity) of  the subject can affect our aim to 
define a history of  the present through the use of  voice? 
It must be noted that a convergent point between McLuhan’s oralism and Derrida’s 
textualism can be eventually found in Walter J. Ong’s study of  the switch from orality 
to literacy. Although Ong’s analysis can certainly be inscribed within the School of  
Chicago movement, whose the intellectual main figure was McLuhan himself, his 
study proceeds with the structuralist intent of  defining the mutual differences of  aural 
and chirographic societies, constantly avoiding any negative connotation which would 
define an oral culture as “a culture without writing” like Levi-Strauss did. In his book 
Orality and Literacy, Ong explained the main effect which the development of  writing 
technology can cause upon an aural society (given that all the societies, before the 
invention of  writing, are oral societies), therefore causing a switch from a social 
structure to another. Nevertheless, this process is not totally homogenizing and 
pervasive: in his demonstration, Ong can quote several groups which are still at the 
stage of  primal orality, namely completely free of  writing. In describing the way in which 
primal orality operates in contrast with literary societies, Ong applies an expected dual 
opposition: according to the title given by the several paragraphs of  Further characteristics 
of  orally based thought and 36 expression, orality distinguishes itself  for being additive 
rather than subordinate, aggregative rather than analytic, redundant or ‘copious’, 
conservative or traditionalist, close to the human lifeworld, agonistically toned, 
empathetic and participatory rather than objectively distanced, homeostatic, 
situational rather than abstract. Nevertheless, it would not be wrong to pinpoint that 
orality contrasts literacy for being essentially performative and ‘temporal’:  
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For anyone who has a sense of  what words are in a primary oral culture, or a 
culture not far removed from primary orality, it is not surprising that the Hebrew 
term dabar means ‘word’ and ‘event’. Malinowski (1923, pp. 45 1, 470–81) has 
made the point that among ‘primitive’ (oral) peoples generally language is a mode 
of  action and not simply a countersign of  thought, though he had trouble 
explaining what he was getting at (Sampson 1980, pp. 223– 6), since understanding 
of  the psychodynamics of  orality was virtually nonexistent in 1923. Neither is it 
surprising that oral peoples commonly, and probably universally, consider words to 
have great power. Sound cannot be sounding without the use of  power . 28
On the other hand, writing stands as the technology which enables any capacity of  
abstraction:  
   
Writing is in a way the most drastic of  the three technologies. It initiated what print 
and computers only continue, the reduction of  dynamic sound to quiescent space, 
the separation of  the word from the living present, where alone spoken words can 
exist . 29
If  we recall what we said about the configuration of  narrative through the 
emplotment in Paul Ricouer’s Time and Narrative, we could be able the recognize the 
respective roles of  writing and voice in this process: whereas writing triggers the 
possibility of  abstraction, therefore of  any categorization of  time’s modalities, it is due 
to the inherent capacity of  orality to identify itself  with the present event, being 
intrinsically correlated with the passing of  time. In this way, as Saint Augustine stated, 
past and future are only thinkable in terms of  the “present of  the past things” and 
“the present of  actual expectations”, in the same way in which any written sentence 
can be produced starting from an oral level. Despite the apparent naivety of  this this 
example, it is fundamental to account, like Ong did, the interrelation of  spoken and 
written language, intended as two open systems which constantly affect and shape 
themselves. Hence, Ong’s cosmology is not just structured upon primal oral societies 
and literary societies. In the era of  electronic development, signed by the creation of  
radio, television and computer, the primal revolution initiated by printing technology 
. W.J Ong,Orality and Literacy, The Technologizing  Of  The Word, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 28
London and New York 1982, p. 31
 Ibidem, p. 2629
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is transcended toward a new level: we assisted to the (slight) switch from literary society 
to media society. More than in any previous society, orality and writing are strictly 
entangled into each other: 
At the same time, with telephone, radio, television and various kinds of  sound tape, 
electronic technology has brought us into the age of  ‘secondary orality’. This new 
orality has striking resemblances to the old in its participatory mystique, its 
fostering of  a communal sense, its concentration on the present moment, and even 
its use of  formulas (Ong 1971, pp. 284–303; 1977, pp. 16–49, 305–41). But it is 
essentially a more deliberate and self- conscious orality, based permanently on the 
use of  writing and print, which are essential for the manufacture and operation of  
the equipment and for its use as well.  
Secondary orality is both remarkably like and remarkably unlike primary orality. 
Like primary orality, secondary orality has generated a strong group sense, for 
listening to spoken words forms hearers into a group, a true audience, just as 
reading written or printed texts turns individuals in on themselves. But secondary 
orality generates a sense for groups immeasurably larger than those of  primary 
oral culture—McLuhan’s ‘global village’. Moreover, before writing, oral folk were 
group-minded because no feasible alternative had presented itself  In our age of  
secondary orality, we are group-minded self-consciously and programmatically. 
The individual feels that he or she, as an individual, must be socially sensitive. 
Unlike members of  a primary oral culture, who are turned outward because they 
have had little occasion to turn inward, we are turned outward because we have 
turned inward .  30
If  we step back to the problematic entangled with the dominancy of  centrism, we can 
probably discern two different way of  performing the individual within writing and 
orality. It is not wrong to say, ironically following Derrida, that the individual in 
language is equally supported by his presence and his absence. Nevertheless, whereas the 
individual is encoded like the speaker into a vocal discourse, which implies a living and 
participatory audience, he loses  his individual status by being part (at least, in oral 
society) of  a shared narrative and therefore of  a shared thought: his living presence is 
the warrant for his absence into the discourse. On the other hand, whereas the 
individual writes a text, he is encoded like an author, namely the singular creator of  a 
script which is not meant to be shared, nor to be positioned into a debate structured 
 W.J Ong,Orality and Literacy, The Technologizing  Of  The Word, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 30
London and New York 1982, p. 133
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upon any agonistic exchange of  words. The post-modern notion of  the death of  the 
author can only reinforce this idea we are trying to highlight: the author’s absence is the 
only ground in which the living presence of  the text can achieve its singularity. 
Therefore, the peculiar case of  secondary orality represents also an instance of  
secondary writing, to the extent that it performs the modality of  a spoken language, 
enhancing a new feature of  textual debate and ‘virtual’ discussion. It is not by chance 
that Liliana Bounegru, in her short essay entitled Secondary Orality in Microblogging has 
pinpointed the new creation of  a living audience into the neutral boundaries of  virtual 
texts represented by the new realities of  social networks:  
  
The secondary oral culture today has reached the highest level of  development in 
cyberspace from all electronic media, and went beyond Ong’s description, where 
the audience plays no role, is absent or unseen, to the audience playing an active 
role in the definition of  the self. Microblogging is the newest phenomena that 
develops on features of  secondary orality. […] The main features of  oral 
communication: subjective, grounded in observable and everyday, close to the 
human life and world, shared knowledge, aggregative, in the sense that it 
collectively builds consensus through dialogue and debate, situational (valuing 
direct experience over theory), are technologically enhanced to transform into 
secondary orality, recognizable through: potential for both subjective and objective, 
transcending barriers of  time and space, grounded in everyday life, collaborative 
knowledge but possible to archive, “chunked” text but possible to aggregate and 
link, allowing both situational and abstract, analytical topics. All these features of  
secondary orality are recognizable in the Twitter world. Although conceived as a 
simulation of  face-to-face communication, Twitter fragments the communication 
process and keeps focus on transmitter, who integrates his followers’ input (tweets, 
profile) as part of  his identity, a reminiscence of  the written discourse, because 
Twitter’s interface is a textual one . 31
It is precisely in this experimental area, experimental for being not completely 
acknowledged by both the users and the critique, that Tellhistory’s project is trying to 
define its own role as a platform in which the personal narrative of  everyone might 
achieve the status of  a collective, even literally historical narrative. Yet, the historical 
narrative owns specific features which are not merely ascribable to the concepts of  
 L. Bounegru, Secondary Orality in Microblogging, published in Master of  Media Amsterdam University 31
website (http://mastersofmedia.hum.uva.nl/blog/2008/10/13/secondary-orality-in-microblogging/)
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collectivity, intersubjectivity and auto-consciousness. Hence, if  we finally reached a 
glimpse of  possibility for Tellhistory to saturate the gap between the Grand and the 
personal narrative, we still need to inquiry the potential of  this project in a field which 
is explicitly historical and historiographical.  
II.4 Oral History: method and meaning 
Until the early Fifties, the status of  oral history has been strictly entangled into a 
larger production of  written historiography: to this extent, oral history was eminently 
employed as a tool for gathering and collecting information and witnesses. The 
popularity slowly achieved by oral history was due to the production of  economic 
recorders which gave the possibility to register any interesting memory. The 
popularization of  this technology mainly affected those field of  non-orthodox 
historiography in which the collection of  aural datas was fundamental to contrast, or 
at least to criticize, the boundaries of  a ‘major’, or rather ‘official’ historiography. 
According to Columbia Encyclopedia : 
The discipline came into its own in the 1960s and early 70s when inexpensive tape 
recorders were available to document such rising social movements as civil rights, 
feminism, and anti–Vietnam War protest. Authors such as Studs Terkel, Alex 
Haley, and Oscar Lewis have employed oral history in their books, many of  which 
are largely based on interviews. In another important example of  the genre, a 
massive archive covering the oral history of  American music has been compiled at 
the Yale School of  Music. By the end of  the 20th cent. oral history had become a 
respected discipline in many colleges and universities. At that time the Italian 
historian Alessandro Portelli and his associates began to study the role that memory 
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itself, whether accurate or faulty, plays in the themes and structures of  oral 
history . 32
It is precisely within Alessandro Portelli’s research that the status of  oral history 
switches from a mere method to a specific discipline featured by original meanings and 
functions. Although his main oeuvre, The Death of  Luigi Trastulli, follows a wide 
tradition of  study-cases in which all the oral testimonies cooperate to describe an event 
excluded by the area of  written history, it breaks up with the canonic limit of  this 
discipline. In fact, by attempting to reconstruct the case of  Luigi Trastulli, a young 
factory worker from Terni, Portelli provides a deep insight into the specificity of  oral 
history, not only for the particular stories which it carries, but also for the special 
modality of  the oral narration. Trough the realization of  this attempt, Portelli is 
necessarily forced to face the limits imposed by canonical categories such as 
‘objectivity’,  ‘factuality’, and the relationship between historian and ‘material’. 
Indeed, the entire definition of  history is at stake in Portelli’s work, for his conception 
is saturated both by an anthropological intention and, on the other hand, a strong 
political aim. In this sense, it is important to stress the influence imposed by the work 
of  Ernesto deMartino, the Italian anthropologist who claimed a participant role for 
the Southern rural masses of  Italy which were officially excluded by history as 
explained by his own master, the philosopher Benedetto Croce. Therefore, The Death 
of  Luigi Trastulli carries a double significant contribution to the writing of  history: 
firstly, it considers oral testimonies for their intrinsic potential rather than for the mere 
informative feature; secondly, it explores the deep political power in which oral history 
is involved in its silent deconstruction of  official historiography.  
When asked to demonstrate the objectivity of  any oral narration, Portelli does not 
hide the impossibility, or rather the senselessness, of  ascribing this kind of  narration to 
the scientific sphere of  objectivity.  In Portelli’s words: 
"oral history." The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed.. . Retrieved March 30, 2017 from 32
Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/reference/encyclopedias-almanacs-
transcripts-and-maps/oral-history
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Oral sources are credible but with a different credibility. The importance of  oral 
testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as 
imagination, symbolism, and desire emerge. Therefore, there are no "false" oral 
sources. Once we have checked their factual credibility with all the established 
criteria of  philological criticism and factual verification which are required by all 
types of  sources anyway, the diversity of  oral history consists in the fact that 
"wrong" statements are still psychologically "true,'' and that this truth may be 
equally as important as factually reliable accounts . 33
Being based on the original production of  subjectivity, the individual historical 
narration is somehow equable to perception: no one can contest another’s one. Hence, 
according to Portelli, the specific interest of  oral history does not interferes with the 
discovery or the verification of  state of  affairs, but rather with the representations and 
interpretations which the individual produced starting by their partial experiences. 
Indeed, the main ‘organ’ which controls this production is the one of  memory, an 
organ which, according to Portelli: 
  
is not a passive depository of  facts, but an active process of  creation of  meanings. 
Thus, the specific utility of  oral sources for the historian lies, not so much in their 
ability to preserve the past, as in the very changes wrought by memory. These 
changes reveal the narrators' effort to make sense of  the past and to give a form to 
their lives, and set the interview and the narrative in their historical context . 34
Thus, the non-objectivity of  memory depends on its intrinsic features which make it 
partial, artificial (creative) and variable. In this sense, memory cannot be treated 
exactly like a written document: in fact, although any document is subjected to the 
necessity of  being proved through a philological analysis (exactly like any oral 
testimony), it also remains stable and invariable despite the several perspective 
applicable on it. Indeed, as we said by analyzing Walter Ong’s thought, any oral 
discourse implies an audience in which the author and the reader are sensibly 
‘reduced’ to the democratic figure of  the speakers, namely speakers within an 
audience. Therefore, while the reader is the unique variable into the act of  text 
 A. Portelli, The Death Of  Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories, Form and Meaning Of  Oral History, Suny Press 33
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reading, in an oral interview both the subjects are involved into the living and variable 
process of  narration: 
The historian may validate his or her discourse by "ventriloquizing" it through the 
narrators' testimony. So far from disappearing in the objectivity of  the sources, the 
historian remains important at least as a partner in dialogue, often as a "stage 
director" of  the interview, or as an "organizer" of  the testimony. Instead of  
discovering sources, oral historians partly create them. Far from becoming mere 
mouthpieces for the working class, oral historians may be using other people's 
words, but are still responsible for the overall discourse . 35
As we can guess from this sentence, the historian’s work does not concern 
exclusively the research or discovery of  datas concerning mere facts. When we 
consider, following Portelli’s discourse, that the historians “partly create” their own 
sources, we are necessarily forced to think about the nature of  these ‘sources’ we are 
discussing. As long as a source is meant to be a-priori to the narration, be it written or 
oral, therefore non-created but strictly ‘happened’, this kind of  sources employed in 
oral narration must concern more the interpretative rather than the representative faculty 
of  historiography:  
The first thing that makes oral history different, therefore, is that it tells us less about 
events than about their meaning. This does not imply that oral history has no factual 
validity. Interviews often reveal unknown events or unknown aspects of  known 
events; they always cast new light on unexplored areas of  the daily life of  the non-
hegemonic classes . 36
The distinction between event and meaning might eventually require a further 
deepening which would take the space of  a separate thesis. Nevertheless, we should 
stress that this separation attempts to account the modality in which event and 
meaning, equally involved both in the written and oral history, changes depending on 
the structure of  the inquire. Therefore, pinpointing that oral history extrapolates the 
meaning out of  an event could signify that the individual act of  interpretation of  an 
 A. Portelli, The Death Of  Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories, Form and Meaning Of  Oral History, Suny Press 35
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event is for the historian the event itself   to investigate on. Indeed, official 
historiography itself  have dealt with the purpose of  furnishing a meaning, namely to 
rationalize the chaotic process of  history trough the lens of   different theories; what 
oral history does is to question the ‘users’ of  history about their own theories, and 
somehow to produce new theories in the very act of  speaking. Hence, if  we 
understand a particular historical research in light of  a theory (ex. marxism), we 
should understand a mnemonic speech by deciphering other elements. If  we admit 
that a theory like marxism can be influential for any individual representation, we 
should also account the irreducible idiosyncrasy in which any individual experience is 
entangled: hence, all along with marxism, many other contexts, sometimes even 
apparently contrasting, can be determinant to properly understand a speech.  
Despite its inherent difficulty to be formalized, there are many semiotic features 
which characterize the oral discourse in order to be comprehended as a meaning-
producer:  
Whereas pauses of  irregular length and position accentuate the emotional content, 
and very heavy rhythmic pauses recall the style of  epic narratives. Many narrators 
switch from one type of  rhythm to another within the same interview, as their 
attitude toward the subjects under discussion changes. Of  course, this can only be 
perceived by listening, not by reading […] 
This is not a question of  philological purity. Traits which cannot be contained 
within segments are the site (not exclusive, but very important) of  essential 
narrative functions: they reveal the narrators' emotions, their participation in the 
story, and the way the story affected them. This often involves attitudes which 
speakers might not be able (or willing) to express otherwise, or elements which are 
not fully within their control. By abolishing these traits, we flatten the emotional 
content of  speech down to the supposed equanimity and objectivity of  the written 
document . 37
By being eminently affectional rather than intellectual, oral history resists the 
codification into writing precisely for its present-form. Nevertheless, being the aim of  
the historian the one of  understanding history rather than moving emotions, the 
emotive potential of  oral history is supposed to be led toward the goal of  knowledge. 
This particular knowledge could be described as the history of  meaning-producing, or 
A. Portelli, The Death Of  Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories, Form and Meaning Of  Oral History, p. 4737
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even history of  imaginarium. As many  contemporary scholars have stated by 
approaching different fields, the imaginary can be described as the set of  beliefs, 
credences, expectations, skills and human relationship which affect the effective 
agenda of  any individual. In Portelli’s case, the imaginary involved in his research 
comprehended the opinions of  workers about  political manifestations, public riots, the 
role of  their own town into a larger national politic, the American/Soviet dominancy, 
up to the topics of  memory itself  and the pursuit of  justice. In this sense, history as 
memory turns into a critical tool for seeing all the relationship, or rather all the Grand 
narratives which, by crossing the existence of  individuals, generates infinite and 
extremely variable micro-narratives.  
II.5 A Tellhistory case : men, nature and governments 
In order to generate a discussion about the problem of  publicly dealing with the 
danger and the effects of  earthquakes, I have created a personal Tellhistory tread in 
which I collected personal testimonies of  people who experienced the tragedy 
happened in the region of  Abruzzo in April 2009. Indeed, this topic constitutes 
nowadays a fundamental knot in which the shaking and insecure body of  Italian 
government crosses the axis of  public opinion and the crucial experience of  the 
individuals. Furthermore, the shocking Abruzzo’s earthquake of  2009 represents the 
mirror of  another recent earthquake which have devastated a huge portion of  Central 
Italy during the summer of  2016. These two episodes, so similar for what concerns the 
geographical circumstances and the urbanist frame, are also exemplar for the way they 
revealed all the subliminal fears, expectations, hopes and regrets directed towards the 
two different governments which dealt with the catastrophe. Being the two 
governments quite distinguishable (the first from the moderate right, the second from 
the moderate left), they obviously managed in different ways to guarantee the security 
of  the citizens involved and to prepare new and quick reconfigurations of  the cities; 
nevertheless, both the approaches generated impressive rhetoric operations aimed 
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either to criticize either to celebrate the govern’s agenda. Indeed, the case I am about 
to show is incomprehensible outside the limits of  a broader historiography, at least one 
perpetuated by the formalization of  news and journalism: while the history of  the 
individual can be ‘read’ in itself  without referring to external elements, his narrative 
can be interpreted only in light of  the infinite other narrative relationships which it 
entertains.  
Nevertheless, it would be relevant to test this case by applying Portelli’s 
methodology and theory, not only to stress the natural equivalence which link 
Tellhistory to the discipline of  oral history, but also to demonstrate how Tellhistory’s 
project might carry a potential of  innovation within the discipline itself  and, in a 
sense, beyond the limits of  the same. 
A testimony that I found particularly interesting is the one of  Luciano C. ,  citizen 38
of  the destroyed city of  L’Aquila, father of  two kids and employed in a factory of  the 
same city.  I developed the interview by using a set of  simple questions in order to 
stimulate as much as possible the stream of  consciousness of  Luciano: hence I asked 
something like “What do you remember of  the night of  the earthquake?”, “Which is 
the image that mostly impressed your memory?”, “Which where your expectations 
after the disaster?” and so on.  
In Luciano’s testimony there are two main moments in which a sort of  organic 
interpretation emerges from the way he speaks, looks at the camera, or simply ignores 
to deepen the discourse. The first concerns the moment in which Luciano explains the 
action of  Protezione Civile, inherently accusing them to have been too “naive” or 
“unprepared” to face the imminent earthquake. The second one concerns the 
moment in which Luciano openly congratulates with the Government (back in the 
days Berlusconi was presiding) for the generous action carried after the disaster. The 
reader should know that although the mentioned action was incredibly quick and 
resolutive, the “New Towns” were built for a small amount of  homeless while many 
others wee left in the agglomerates of  tends. In both the cases, Luciano voluntarily 
avoided to name the responsible agents: in the first instance, he converged with the 
 38
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general idea that Protezione Civile was generally guilty for not having advised the 
citizens about the imminent danger; on the other, he celebrated the immediate 
intervention of  Berlusconi’s government. Indeed, for those who followed Italian 
politics at that time, the inherent paradox immediately emerges: for Guido Bertolaso, 
chief  of  Protezione Civile (afterwards charged for plural homicide) was also director 
of  Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri under the fourth Berlusconi’s govern (and, in 
many occasion, favorited and defended by the same Prime Minister).  
In my opinion, this interview was emblematic for two reasons. Firstly, it remarked a 
feature that we already discussed in a theoretical frame: every individual narrative 
necessarily resists the integration with a major narrative (in this case, that of  the 
newspapers and, somehow, of  official history) and thus it resulted hardly assimilable to 
a broader concept of  historiography. On second thought, it also permitted to guess a 
deeper problem: although Luciano’s story is not compatible with the official state of  
affairs, it is also hardly definable as ‘individual’. Here I’m referring back to the 
Benjamin’s problem of  bringing experience out of  a tale: Luciano’s status as the 
‘survivor of  a tragedy’ does not allow him to add something theoretically valuable to 
the debate about the earthquake’s history; somehow his opinion is way more based on 
a national-spread rhetoric which opposed the Berlusconi/Bertolaso’s supporters 
against all the others. Indeed, there is nothing wrong in this process: it is doubtless that 
Luciano’s consideration came from an evaluation of  his own experience (being 
introduced into a New Town’s house, having abandoned his own apartment etc.). 
Nevertheless, more than his individual-status, what seems to decade is his own 
belonging to a community, namely the possibility to ascribe to a determinate group the 
interpretative priority concerning specific topics, in this case the experience of  the 
earthquake.  My guess was that, in a world fragmented into the unifying power of  
media communication, it raises a kind of  impossibility of  the “to-speak-for”, which 
somehow put at stake the anthropological aim of  Portelli’s research: namely, to let the 
individuals emancipate from a superior discourse to make individual-history valuable 
again. This problem, now briefly introduced, will be the centre of  the next chapter. 
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                                      The Community 
                                                   Chapter Three 
III.1 Introduction 
Trough the exposition of  a theory of  oral history, one that could fit with the 
parameters and the intentions sustained by Tellhistory’s project, we finally identified a 
specific method able to elevate the individual narrative up to the formal level of  
historiography. By giving a new role to the undistinguishable unity of  spoken and 
written words into the epoch of  secondary orality, we confirmed once again the 
necessity for a position in between: between the machine of  grand narratives and the 
living sphere of  individual experience, between the variable field of  oral testimony and 
the stable area of  writing. In this final chapter, we are necessarily forced to define, or at 
least to inquiry about the missing element of  our scheme: after having problematized 
the message (narrative), and consequently the medium which vehicles the message 
(orality), we are unavoidably led to question the nature of  the user, namely to define the 
features which characterize the subject of  oral narration. At first sight, the order given 
to this analysis might appear problematic or even inverted if  we consider the 
indisputable centrality that the subject retains in every process of  narration, especially 
when the last one is meant to be authentic, biographical, historical.  
Therefore, the apparent specularity we already encountered in the binomials 
grand/individual narratives and written/oral narration is not simply reciprocal, but 
often even ‘chiasmatic’: in this sense, our previous analysis of  the notion of  centrism 
gave us the dimension of  ambivalence which constantly pervades this discussion. In 
this sense, the following reflections on the nature of  the user will probably add further 
ramifications to the simple, and yet quite dense, scheme we are trying to outline: by 
being so intrinsically circular and redundant, this analysis might achieve a rhizomatic 
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structure rather than an arborescent and dualistic frame. Once again, if  on the one 
hand we will always refer to the generality of  a concept, namely to its possibility to be 
enlarged and then stabilized into a theory, on the other we will constantly 
problematize the fugitive figure of  the individual and the collective, in order to 
extrapolate, where possible, a form in which both terms might achieve a state of  
coherence, or at least define a specific lack of  the same coherence we are 
accomplishing.  
Hence, if  we appealed improperly to the concept of  rhizome, we did it to the extent 
that 
  
as a model for culture, the rhizome resists the organizational structure of  
the root-tree system which charts causality along chronological lines and looks 
for the original source of  'things' and looks towards the pinnacle or conclusion 
of  those 'things.' A rhizome, on the other hand, is characterized by 'ceaselessly 
established connections between semiotic chains, organizations of  power, and 
circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles.' Rather than 
narrativize history and culture, the rhizome presents history and culture as a 
map or wide array of  attractions and influences with no specific origin or 
genesis, for a 'rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, 
between things, interbeing, intermezzo  39
The idea of  ‘mapping’, be it of  a physic movement or of  an abstract concept, 
seems to fit perfectly with our intention of  designing a non-hierarchical interaction 
between the formal ground of  theory and the living sphere of  the individual in history. 
By expressing, or rather representing, the mutual relationship between the subjects and 
the surrounding environment, the act of  mapping comprehends both the position of  
the individual and the position of  the group to which he belongs. Although this 
consideration might result redundant, if  not literally obvious, it played an important 
role in a particular way of  mapping the world by paying attention to all the dynamics 
which influence the relationship between subjects and space.  
 G. Deleuze - F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Penguin Classics Books, 39
London and New York, 2003, 
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In Arjun Appadurai’s Modernity At Large, this sort of  multiple intersection is for the 
first time analyzed beyond the traditional boundaries of  Nation-State identity. His 
theory starts from questioning a problem which covered a huge portion of  modern 
anthropology, namely the unrepresentable dynamic of  homogenization and 
localization, which somehow resembles our attempt to integrate the personal and the 
‘impersonal’ narrative of  history. In that sense, homogenization as promoted by 
capitalism and liberal economy owns the power to unify cultures around the same 
fetichism of  production, but for the same reason of  being almost completely 
dissociated by the dominant imperative of  State-Nations, it accomplishes new forms 
of  ‘singularity’ able to transcend the previous known forms of  community . The case of  
Filipinos men who sing old folk-rock belonged to the 1950’s American repertoire 
better than the Americans themselves serves particularly well to introduce the 
revolutionary idea of  -scape proposed by Appadurai. In order to explain the inherent 
paradox of  centralization pursued by western capitalism, Appadurai proposed a 
segmentary vision based on the most explanatory faculty which distinguish the 
contemporary subject from all the previous historic configuration: the imaginary. Basing 
this reflection both on Anderson’s imagined community and on the Frankfurt School’s 
idea of  images, the different scapes outline the qualitative differences which enable the 
subject to configure his own identity depending on variances which do not belong 
directly to the standard national (or social) set.  We can synthesize Appadurai’s scheme 
in this way:  
 - Ethnoscapes — the ever shifting “landscape of  persons who constitute the shifting 
world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers, and other 
moving groups and persons”. 
- Mediascapes – “refer both to the distribution of  electronic capabilities to produce 
and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations and film 
production studios) which are now available to a growing number of  private and 
public interests throughout the world, and to the images of  the world created by these 
media”. “Tend to be image- centered, narrative-based accounts of  strips of  reality”. 
-Technoscapes – “the global configuration, also ever fluid, of  technology, and of  the 
fact that technology, both high and low, both mechanical and informational, now 
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moves at high speeds across various kinds of  previously impervious boundaries” driven 
by “increasingly complex relationships between money flows, political possibilities, and 
the availability of  both un- and highly skilled labor”. 
-Finanscapes – the flow of  capital: “currency markets, national stock exchanges, and 
commodity speculations move mega-monies through national turnstiles at blinding 
speed”. 
-Ideoscapes – “Also concatenations of  images, but they are often directly political and 
frequently have to do with the ideologies of  states and the counter-ideologies of  
movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of  it”  40
As we already discussed in the section dedicated to Alessandro Portelli’s oral history, 
the oral discipline is made partially to accomplish the non-accomplishable aim of  
designing a history of  the individual as entangled in network of  relationship which link 
him to his memories, to his future, to his own expectations about the present. If, on the 
one hand, this aim is unreachable for the immanent variability and the constant 
changing of  the sources, on the other it appears understandable as a scheme which 
consider the individual within a movement, be it more dynamic than the nation and 
more fluid than the state-form. Therefore, while we can follow Appadurai when he 
proposes a vision of  community that evidently transcends the limits of  all the 
dominant and traditional forms, we should at the same time question the meaning of  
community, its own epistemology, and consider the possible outcome of  such a new 
categorization. Hence, does any scape simply undermine the canonical idea of  
community, or is itself  a new modality of  community?  
If  we consider, still following Appadurai, the case of  those Sri-Lanka guys which 
usually go to the U.S. to drive a cab, tempted by the tales of  their fellows who returned 
enriched  by the job abroad, how should we define their community: do they belong to 
the Sri-Lanka’s expats, to the Sri-Lanka’s expats who drive a cab, to the Sri-Lanka 
expats who drive a cab with the dream of  going back to their country and tell their 
A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of  Globalization, University of  Minnesota Press, 40
1996, p. 329-331 (the whole set of  definitions belongs to this part)
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fascinating stories? It is clear to foresee that, proceeding on this tread, we will 
experience the unattainability of  the Portelli’s analysis, namely the impossibility of  
designing the exhaustive subjective portrait of  the individual by appealing to major 
definitions, likewise ideas, images or finances.  
Whereas Appadurai’s analysis opened a broad and necessary horizon where to 
deconstruct the traditional idea of  community, it also deconstructed its own 
deconstruction: such an idea of  community turns out to be unavailable because it 
considers the singularity of  the individual within an idea of  community where he rests 
indissolubly alone. We can conclude that while the application of  any -scapes  is 
incredibly useful to approach globality from a narrative perspective, it also precludes 
the possibility to escape this scheme: a new Grand Narrative, a narrative of  disjunction 
and dispersion, of  loneliness and singularity, of  impossibility for definition waits at the 
gates of  this theory. Nevertheless, how can we elaborate further the assumption of  a 
community of  individuals, or even an individuals’ community? What is the power of  this 
approach? 
III.2 Future Community 
In order to better qualify the dimension of  Appadurai’s paradox, it would be 
relevant to step back to a more general definition of  community, one that might give 
us a positive explanation of  what a community is meant to be. Traditionally identified 
as the milestone of  any reflection upon ‘community’ in sociology, Ferdinand Tönnies’s 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft proposed the first practical distinction between community 
and civil society. Indeed, community was already a interesting term within German 
philosophy: not by chance, Hegel used this term in several circumstances, often with 
ambiguous meanings, which unequivocally influenced Tönnies necessity for a 
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definitive distinction. In Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right community is often referred to as 
‘Gemeinwesen’, which indicate that  
In an ethical community, it is easy to say what man must do, what are the duties 
he has to fulfil in order to be virtuous; he has simply to follow the well-known and 
explicit rules of  his own situation  41
In other passages, community is otherwise related to der Staat (the state), recalling 
indeed the specific figure which follows the creation of  Zivilgesellschaft, namely the ‘civil 
society’ born from the apparent opposition of  subjectivity and pursuit of  the good 
resolved into the sphere of  ethics. Therefore, ethic does not work properly to posit 
‘community’ on the side of  State rather than on that of  civil society. Nevertheless, this 
lack of  position into Hegel’s philosophy might turn out to be eloquent if  we consider 
how the German philosopher stressed the fundamental organicity (or totality) of  both 
Staat and Zivilgesellschaft, namely their adequacy to be defined as unici, objects 
intelligible and distinguishable among all the others. We can argue that the notion of  
community unavoidably escapes the property of  ‘unicity’, as Appadurai seems to 
suggest with his disjunctive theory.  
Nevertheless, the classical interpretation proposed by Tönnies attempts to separate 
Gemeinschaft (community) from Gesellschaft (civil society) according to the principle of  
nature. In that sense 
Gemeinschaft is based on the idea that in the original or natural state there is a 
complete unity of  human wills. This sense of  unity is maintained even when 
people become separated. It takes various forms, depending on how far the 
relationship between differently situated individuals is predetermined and ‘given’. 
The common root of  these relationships is the all-embracing character of  the sub-
conscious, ‘vegetative’ life that stems from birth: human wills, each one housed in a 
physical body, are related to one another by descent and kinship; they remain 
united, or become so out of  necessity  42
 F. Hegel, Philosophy of  Right, First Published by G. Bell, London, 1896. Translated: by S W Dyde, 41
1896, paragraph 150
 F. Tönnies, Community and Civil Society, edited by Jose Harris, University of  Oxford, Cambridge 42
University Press, 2001, p. 22
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Whereas  
The theory of  Gesellschaft takes as its starting point a group of  people who, 
as in Gemeinschaft, live peacefully alongside one another, but in this case 
without being essentially united – indeed, on the contrary, they are here 
essentially detached. In Gemeinschaft they stay together in spite of  everything 
that separates them; in Gesellschaft they remain separate in spite of  everything 
that unites them. As a result, there are no activities taking place which are 
derived from an a priori and pre-determined unity and which therefore express 
the will and spirit of  this unity through any individual who performs them. 
Nothing happens in Gesellschaft that is more important for the individual’s 
wider group than it is for himself . 43
We should precise that the natural condition quoted in the first paragraph is not 
strongly stated as a reflection on the ‘state of  nature’: rather, it attempts to delimit 
those groups which are not completely formalized within a system of  rules, namely 
a group whose structure precedes, or exceeds, any political frame. Therefore, 
whereas community is naturally enacted by culture, civil society is rather enforced 
by superior power. According to Tönnies, any group can be one and the other 
simultaneously, that means, in any defined group could be pointed what belongs to 
the community and what belongs to the civil society.  Hence, if  the state represents 
the apex of  enforcement of  a ‘non-natural power’, and the community is supposed 
to be the original and spontaneous ground of  interaction between ‘natural’ 
subjects, it follows that civil society is meant to be that level of  interaction in which 
the individuals play specific ‘institutionalized’ roles. Indeed, this set of  theory turns 
out to be pretty naive to what it concerns the power’s dynamics which pervades 
societies at any level and plateau.  
Altough a post-modern critique would perfectly fit with the dimension of  this 
problem, it’s in a precedent thinker that we can already find an exhaustive 
depiction of  the problem of  community: Alexis de Tocqueville, with his unlimited 
curiosity towards the newborn system of  democracy, was way more lucid and 
 F. Tönnies, Community and Civil Society, p. 5243
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somehow prophetic about this theme.In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville writes 
the following about soft despotism: 
Thus, After having thus successively taken each member of  the community 
in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then extends 
its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of  society with a 
network of  small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the 
most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise 
above the crowd. The will of  man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and 
guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained 
from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not 
tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till 
each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of  timid and industrious 
animals, of  which the government is the shepherd . 44
In this passage, Tocqueville is referring to a particular concept developed by 
himself, namely the concept of  “soft despotism”, the form that the relations 
community-state assumes when the first opposes the second by constituting a 
strong, self-conscious and contrastive auto-identity. Anticipating many future 
critical positions, as those elaborated by the Frankfurt School, Tocqueville argued 
how the power machine embodied by democracy is able to reduce under its net the 
contrasting authority of  community through acts of  legitimization, control, and 
identification. It follows that, hypothetically, communities exist only outside the 
borders of  state/civil society, hence they exist exactly in their absence, in their 
weakness, in their impossibility to distinguish themselves from any authoritarian 
frame. From Tönnies’ analysis, what resisted the trial of  time is precisely its 
paradox: the impossibility to distinguish community from the state. Our task 
assumes at this point an alchemic feature: looking for something where it doesn’t 
exist, in the pursuit of  media and narratives which are not here yet.   
On second thought, the idea of  community as something non-existent is a 
rhetoric already integrated into the contemporary discussion: the same 
Appadurai’s scheme gave us a dimension of  the non-definability of  community 
within the global disjunctive reality. 
 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, Book 4, Chapter 6 44
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Zygmunt Bauman has immensely contributed to the discussion we have just 
outlined. In his book entitled Community, Seeking Safety in an Insecure World, the Polish 
philosopher introduced the discussion about community starting from an 
elaboration of  ‘common sense’, that is by expressing the usual feeling that 
accompanies the mere world ‘community’ within daily speeches. According to 
Bauman, the common reaction to the word ‘community’ is ‘warm’:  
If  someone wandered off  the right track, we would often explain his 
unwholesome conduct by saying that 'he has fallen into bad company’. If  
someone is miserable, suffers a lot and is consistently denied a dignified life, we 
promptly accuse society - the way it is organized, the way it works. Company or 
society can be bad; but not the community. Community, we feel, is always a good 
thing . 45
The ‘good thing’ that the individual recognizes, or rather guesses, depends on 
several sets of  imaged meanings. Firstly, Bauman explains, it comes from a social 
desire to not be abandoned (“We won’t let you down”, as a recent President 
proclaims) to always find a help where needed. Consequently, it depends on the 
desire of  founding a proper identity, identity intended as a hidden place where to 
practice trust and loyalty between each other. Finally, being this identity a place, it 
is supposed to be a safe place, a refuge delimited by explicit boundaries, protected 
from the fearful dangers of  the outside. It is exactly this third point which 
constitutes the original problematic within the community: into this field, the 
individual is simultaneously appealed by the desire for security and the appetite 
freedom. Therefore, the pursuit of  community can achieve the necessary demand 
of  security only by renouncing  the natural exigence of  freedom:  
  
The price is paid in the currency of  freedom, variously called ‘autonomy', 
'right to self-assertion’, 'right to be yourself ’. Whatever you choose, you gain 
 Z. Bauman, Community : Seeking Safety in an Insecure World, Polity Press in association with Blackwell 45
Publishers Ltd , Cambridge, 2001, p. 1
!51
some and lose some. Missing community means missing security; gaining 
community, if  it happens, would soon mean missing freedom . 46
It follows that the imagined community we described first unavoidably collides 
with the contingent reality of  community, namely its impossibility to completely 
fulfill the desires of  the individuals. Hence, what is the role played not by the 
actual, but rather by the ‘ideal’, ‘imaginative’ community? In Bauman’s brilliant 
analysis: 
In short, Community' stands for the kind of  world which is not, regrettably, 
available to us - but which we would dearly wish to inhabit and which we hope 
to repossess. Raymond Williams, the thoughtful analyst of  our shared 
condition, observed caustically that the remarkable thing about community is 
that 'it always has been'. We may add: or that it is always in the future . 47
In its being fragmented between the mythical past and the futuristic future, 
community confirms its incontestable presence within the sphere of  imaginary. As 
far as the past its concerned, the community which ‘always has been”, it is quite 
easy to recognize the undermining power of  the kind of  rhetoric centered on the 
production of  a social nostalgia, as Appadurai has stated, often with the precise 
interest of  stimulating national or sub-national claims for auto-identity and 
independence. At the same time, while that kind of  rhetorics addressee the past as 
the mythical place in which the community was founded and lived before getting 
lost, they also proclaim a mission toward the future, toward the realization, the 
complete fulfillment of  an imminent common project.  
If  we relate the imaginative status of  community to the possibility of  enhancing 
a new-oral-historiography, as the one generally described in Chapter II, the 
outcome turns out to be quite controversial. When we claimed the necessity to 
elevate the individual presence into the plateau of  historical narrative, we have 
proposed secondary orality as a practical bridge toward the emancipation from Grand 
 Ibidem, p. 646
Z. Bauman, Community : Seeking Safety in an Insecure World, p. 1047
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Narratives and, at the same time, we accepted, as Bounegru argued, the possibility 
for a re-tribalization of  the users. Once admitted that the users are really re-
tribalizing their own interactions, what is meant to be the product of  this modern 
tribalization? Furthermore, it seems that the claimed presence of  the individual 
collides with the inherent non-presence of  the community: can we accept the 
imaginary as the only convergent point, or should we see the imaginary itself  as the 
limit which divides the man from his dream of  community? This  theoretical knot 
represents the deep core of  this research: our guess is that within the concept of  
community we are gambling with the very possibility to unify the two polar 
narratives or, on the other hand, to demonstrate a problematic horizon in which 
new theories will spread.  
III.3 Whatever Community 
The case of  Luciano Cretarola is intrinsically emblematic for the role played by 
the imaginary within the contingent state of  affairs embodied in history.  As many 
historical facts are, the event of  the Abruzzo’s earthquake represent an episode of  
violence. But, we should ask, what kind of  violence is that? Non-symbolic violence, 
non-judicable violence, violence without an executor,  without power, violence 
outside the boundaries of  violence.  In his well-know essay titled Force of  Law: the 
Mystical Foundation of  Authority , Jacques Derrida traced a precise limit to the 48
concept of  violence: as in Wittgenstein’s logic, violence is that action which allows 
binary statements which would respond to the categories of  truth and justice.   
Being natural violence, or action without subject, it turns out to be excluded 
from any possible criterion of  judgement: Abruzzo’s earthquake, together with all 
the other natural catastrophes, sits somehow outside the kingdom of  language.  
 J. Derrida,Force of  Law, The “Mystical Foundation of  Authority”, appeared in Probing the Limits of  48
Representation : Nazism and the “Final Solution”, ed. Saul Friedlander, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1992 
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This consideration leads us to two different thoughts. Firstly, being a form of  
violence without an executioner, natural violence necessarily lacks victims. Indeed, 
that does not means that an earthquake cannot effectively hurt anyone; it means 
that it cannot judge, select, choose the identity of  its victims. The mere criterion of  
geographical membership (namely, the fact the earthquake happened in Abruzzo) is 
insufficient to make the Abruzzo’s citizens the designated victims of  this violence. 
In that sense, an inquiry on the Abruzzo’s disaster attempted with the Portelli’s 
model would not accomplish the goal of  representing the thoughts of  a 
community, because a community does not subsist: among the victims there were 
all kind of  ages, classes, political supporters, workers. More than any other event, 
the natural disaster stresses the fundamental individualism of  community. Secondly, 
the sentence according to which “ natural violence does not satisfy any criteria of  
judgement” turns out to be incomplete. In fact, the fact that the cataclysm itself  
does not let space to any judgment, the symbolic order in which the cataclysm 
burst into gets completely revolved, giving space to an infinite process of  judgments 
and representations. Hence, under the devastating light of  cataclysm, all the 
surrounding elements enter the same symbolic order: security, mutual help, media 
communication and the government are all put at stake and declined as the true 
meaning of  the tragedy.  
As we can easily understand, the geographical limit of  the catastrophe quickly 
exceeds the limit of  the territory, invading the imaginary of  the people that did not 
directly experience the tragedy.  
The idea of  community which comes out of  this analysis is not only disjunctive 
à la Appadurai, it is also pervasive, for its capacity to invest the totality of  the 
imaginary of  the users. The community intended this way is the specular image of  
the cataclysm: something that does not create a symbolic order of  judgment 
because it cannot designate its own subjects; something that cannot constitute an 
order precisely because nothing subsists outside its boundaries.  
Globality is the cataclysm we experience everyday through imaginary. No one is 
responsible for it: its victims cannot be identified as such because they are 
everywhere. Its presence displaces the real community and simultaneously it makes 
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it thinkable.  Still, the simple act of  imagining cannot aspire to the general canon 
to define the new coming community: it can only work to show the disjunctive and 
pervasive individualism which poses the major limit to the problem. If  such a 
community exists, or rather a process toward the formation of  a community, what 
is the experience that constitutes the catastrophe of  globality? 
In a famous short essay entitled The Coming Community, Giorgio Agamben has 
addressed this problem of  definition we are trying to outline. Indeed, in his 
reflection the idea of  annihilation of  the traditional boundaries of  community 
constitutes the starting point for a pursuit of  a new element of  identification. 
Particularly interesting is the departure from the structure specifically visual 
promoted by Debord (and indeed by Appadurai): 
The spectacle does not simply coincide, however, with the sphere of  images 
or with what we call today the media: It is “a social relation among people, 
mediated by images,” the expropriation and the alienation of  human sociality 
itself. Or rather, using a lapidary formula, “the spectacle is capital to such a 
degree of  accumulation that it becomes an image.” But for that very reason, the 
spectacle is nothing but the pure form of  separation: When “the real world is 
transformed into an image and images become real, the practical power of  
humans is separated from itself  and presented as a world unto itself .  49
Images provide a separation between the living experience and the act of  
imagination, furthermore they subvert the very relation within this binomial: the 
experience degrades to the insignificant (meaningless) status of  image-portrait, and 
the imaginary becomes a “world unto itself ”, the only capable of  reading and 
interpreting this kind of  experience.  Agamben’s fundamental revelation is based 
on the fact that those images, totally undifferentiated within this sort of  capitalism 
of  imagination, can lead toward a deeper experience which transcends the original 
visual structure: 
 G. Agamben, The Coming Community,Volume 1 of  Theory out of  bounds, University of  Minnesota Press, 49
1993, p. 
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Whereas under the old regime the estrangement of  the communicative 
essence of  humans took the form of  a presupposition that served as a common 
foundation, in the society of  spectacle it is this very communicativity, this 
generic essence itself  (i.e., language), that is separated in an autonomous sphere. 
What hampers communication is communicability itself; humans are separated 
by what unites them . 50
In this sense, communicability resists communication the same way the 
imagined community prevents the actualization of  real community. If  we keep on 
following Agamben, we would discover that the experience of  this gap constitutes 
itself  a revealing moment for what it concerns the status of  communication/
community. In his pursuit for an element that would furnish the reader’s key of  the 
society of  spectacle, Agamben isolates the experimentum linguae, namely the 
absolutely original experience of  language itself: not this or that proposition, not 
any specific statement, but the very ‘objectuality’ of  language. In Agamben’s 
words, this act of  acknowledgment represents a pragmatic turn thanks to which 
men are allowed to access the dimension of  the new, coming community:  
Contemporary politics is this devastating experimentum linguae that all over the 
planet unhinges and empties traditions and beliefs, ideologies and religions, 
identities and communities.  
Only those who succeed in carrying it to completion–without allowing what 
reveals to remain veiled in the nothingness that reveals, but bringing language 
itself  to language–will be the first citizens of  a community with neither 
presuppositions nor a State, where the nullifying and determining power of  
what is common will be pacied and where the Shekinah will have stopped 
sucking the evil milk of  its own separation . 51
It would not be naive to discern in this sentence a kind of  thought that would 
contrast the heading movement of  the above mentioned Grand Narratives. In this 
case, it is the language proper of  nationalistic, cultural and identity centered 
discourses that is put at stake against a more essential, and yet not determinable, 
practice of  language. At a first glance, we could be tempted to immediately relate 
this whatever-language with the aim pursued by Tellhistory: namely, a meta-
 Ibidem, p.50
 G. Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 51
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narrative which, freed by its structural limits, would reflect upon itself, opening up 
the possibility for the possibility of  a “global” community. Indeed, this 
undeterminability of  language is the feature which triggers the movement from a 
nation-state identity toward a non-identity community founded on the unique 
possibility of  belonging. Although this perspective might sound extremely fashionable 
for our purpose, we must at least indicate two problematic knots within this set of  
theories.  
Firstly, Agamben’s prophecy can barely be indicated as a ‘community’. By 
saying this, we do not mean that the common feature of  belonging-to-something 
does not satisfy the necessary requirements for designing a community; we mean 
that a community can subsist only in relation with an outside, namely with other 
kinds of  real or imaginary communities. Therefore, a community without an 
outside cannot even be thought, it cannot become the symbolic order which would 
describe the nature of  the individuals involved in it. The only breach that would 
eventually open up a space for this community stands between the effective domain 
of  State-nation communities and the projective appaerence of  the coming 
community in the individuals imaginary:  
  
Whatever singularities cannot form a societas because they do not possess any 
identity to vindicate nor any bond of  belonging for which to seek recognition. 
In the final instance the State can recognize any claim for identity–even that of  
a State identity within the State (the recent history of  relations between the 
State and terrorism is an eloquent conformation of  this fact). What the State 
cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community 
without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable 
condition of  belonging . 52
Thus, if  representability does not work for Agamben’s claim, we are led to think 
that only another category of  language might enhance the advent of  the global 
community: that is the category of  performativity. The reasons why we might 
consider performativity as the peculiarity of  this whatever language are essentially 
two: as we just observed, representation and signification belong to the the 
 G. Agamben, The Coming Community, p.52
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grammata of  specific languages, thus they depend on specific visions structured 
within la langue; on the other hand, performativity allows us to consider this 
whatever language as the space of  action which transcend the impositions of  
communicativity we already encountered. Therefore, the free play of  language can 
only rely on the side of  la parole.  
This consideration introduces the second problem, namely the apparent mutism 
which marks Agamben’s reflection about the difference between spoken and 
written language. Indeed this topic remains obscure in the essay The Coming 
Community : the philosophy of  whatever might erroneously push to consider that 
this essential difference is, for Agamben, absolutely pointless. Nevertheless, in 
Infancy and History, the Italian philosopher payed a different attention to the role 
played by the spoken word into the constitution of  a global community’s ethic. 
Following the same discourse which marked the metaphysical experience of  
language itself, he shaped the analysis by focusing on a different frame: in this case, 
what really defines the awareness concerning the experimentum linguae is the 
experience of  a linguistic lack. Quoting the heideggerian idea of  a linguistic 
process which constantly experiences the impossibility to pronounce, or rather to 
find names in particular circumstances, Agamben immediately relates this 
perception of  something-missing to the importance of  ethic: according to him, 
ethic and language both subsist in the dark land of  the unknown, for they can only 
constitute themselves whereas rules, notions, paradigms do not already exist. For 
what precisely concerns the emptiness of  language, Agamben stresses the presence 
of  a “void space” between phonè and grammata: the same fact that the one can be 
translated into the other marks the the absolute irreducibility of  spoken word to 
the written word and viceversa. Once given the dimension of  this emptiness, it is 
possible to think that 
Only because man finds himself  cast into language without the vehicle of  a 
voice, and only because the experimentum linguae lures him, grammarless, into that 
void and that aphonia, do an ethos and a community of  any kind become 
possible.  
So the community that is born of  the experimentum linguae cannot take the 
form of  a presupposition, not even in the purely 'grammatical' form of  a self-
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presupposition. The speaking and the spoken with which we measure ourselves 
in the experi- mentum are neither a voice nor a gramma; as arch-trans-cendentals, 
they are not even thinkable as a quiddity, a quid of  which we could ever, in 
Plotinus' fine image, take moirai, any share. The first outcome of  the experimentum 
linguae, therefore, is a radical revision of  the very idea of  Community. The only 
content of  the experimentum is that there is language; we cannot represent this, by 
the dominant model in our culture, as a language, as a state or a patrimony of  
names and rules which each people transmit from generation to generation . 53
For various reasons, the theoretical establishment of  a void space seems 
particularly efficient for our purpose of  describing the intellectual place occupied 
by Tellhistory. Somehow, the empty space of  the experimentum calls for an action of  
definition which we have outlined all over this thesis: a definition concerning the 
emptiness about the narrative which sustains the history of  the present, a definition 
of  the status of  the unheard voice of  the individual and the unaccepted text of  the 
power, and finally, a definition of  the community we are experiencing nowhere. In 
this sense, the opera of  Tellhistory is not meant to occupy any intellectual place: 
conversely, it resides into the practical sphere of  action, a sort of  action which is 
inherently related with  the process of  translation. It also seems that this claim for a 
definition cannot go trough an act of  signification: for language is experienced in 
itself, also the community and the respective narrative must follow the same tread, 
and thus they cannot become interpretative tools of  themselves. To transcend this 
paradox we must operate toward another paradox: the only way to outline those 
problems is about the very act of  outlining: the problem can only be performed.  
III.4 Poietical Community 
This last paragraph attempts to furnish an extreme thought to the constant 
opening discourse we have faced all over this thesis. Indeed, it cannot be final and 
 G. Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of  Experience, Translated by Liz Heron, Verso 53
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exhausting : it can only try to resume, by naming the problem, what the problem 
essentially is. Naming, and not defining: as Judith Butler reminds us, the doctor 
who exclaims “he’s a boy!” is not only describing a biological fact: he’s producing 
an object. To find a name, as we have seen with Agamben, follows the moment of  
lack that the whatever-individual is supposed to experiment within the ‘global 
community’. Yet, the name we will seek cannot be connotative, for it attempts to let 
the problem of  definition to the user, namely to let a space of  exchange between 
the Grand Narratives of  historiography and the singular narratives of  individuals. 
Furthermore, we find ourselves in the need for surpassing Agamben’s position: if  
the individual is asked to perform new forms of  ethic, he is also asked to fulfill all the 
other lacks: hence, to perform new narratives, to create new media, and so on. 
From now on, once understood the extent to which Tellhistory itself  performs an 
experimentum linguae ( and so an experimentum civitas), we will try to give a name to the 
two major problems we have discussed: hence, we will talk of  poietical history and 
poietical community.  
One of  the most interesting Tellhistory’s topic concerned the individual inquiry 
on September 11th, developed during the summer 2016 for the 15th year 
anniversary of  the tragedy which inaugurated, once for all, our entrance into the 
global world. Among those who accepted to release their personal memories, I 
found particularly intriguing the testimony of  a young Italian girl named Sabina 
Chionzi, whom I personally interviewed at the Schipol Airport on September 9th 
2016 . When I initially approached with the simple question “do you remember 54
what were you doing on September 11th 2001?” she smiled with a surprised 
expression. According to her memory, she was playing with his older brother: they 
were building towers with lego blocks and, once concluded the construction, they 
were about to destroy them by simulating a catastrophe. Suddenly, their mother 
crashed into the room, switched on the TV and assisted, with her kids, to the 
tragedy live-broadcasted through the televisions all over the globe.  
 See “A strange coincidence on 9/11” from the Tellhistory Youtube’s channel, at https://54
www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzRwtWN-ME8
!60
Indeed we should agree with Portelli by saying that this memory does not 
constitute a fact: rather, it gives the dimension of  an interpretation: it shows a 
singular symbolic order in which the fact assumes a sense. Furthermore, the 
disaster of  9/11 can barely be considered a fact, in the strict sense of  something 
directly experienced by the individual: it is rather the experience of  an experience, 
spread by the media, but nonetheless lived within the daily life sphere.  
Obviously, Sabina’s story might be read in several ways : nevertheless, it requires 
to be listened and watched before anything else. The initial smile recalls an interior 
surprise, similar to that amusement we feel when we discover something new: the 
memory constitutes that bridge which linked the naivety of  the game to the 
unavoidably reality of  the tragedy. Strangely enough, is not the terroristic attack 
that signifies the game: its rather the micro-experience of  playing with toy-towers 
that becomes the parameter for judging the real world, namely to experience the 
dramatic distance (or proximity) that divides the personal from the global experience.  
This distance/proximity marks the empty space (described by Agamben) which 
induces the individual to fulfill it with a personal action of  interpretation. The 
mentioned act of  interpretation assumes the features of  a poetical creation: then, 
the towers’ game becomes suddenly a metonymy for the contingency of  9-11.  
Among the 531 video-interviews gathered up by Tellhistory's staff  in the last 
year, many other cases might be quoted to illustrate the fundamentally poetical 
action which sustain this kind of  narrative and community. For example, a 
Pakistani girl named Scheherezade Rahim told her memory of  Benazir Bhutto’s 
assassination (the first female Prime Minister of  Pakistan’s history) by recalling the 
story of  her sister’s marriage .  Her big sister, tells Scheherezade, planned to to 55
marry her lover the day after Bhutto got killed. Indeed, the notice of  the 
assassination caught everyone unprepared, also because, as Scheherezade said, the 
Pakistani media were not well-developed in 2007: every journal spread different, 
and often controversial, versions of  the event. Therefore, the couple was forced to 
postpone the marriage, and the cheerful atmosphere which marked the previous 
 See “ Assassination of  Benazir Bhutto” from the Tellhistory Youtube’s channel, at https://55
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZpCz12gxk0
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days was definitely destroyed: not only the marriage was celebrated in quasi 
complete secrecy, but the whole city of  Karachi was completely empty. “If  you 
could imagine a completely empty racetrack, it’s what it looked like”, so 
Scheherezade described the nuptial march of  her sister.  Now we should ask, what 
is the core center of  this tale? The marriage or the assassination? The one and the 
other, as they both behave as a metonymy for each other: the failure of  the 
celebration stands for the astonishment of  a whole country and vice-versa. The 
center is here the very production of  sense that subsist upon both the elements: it is 
credible that for Scheherezade the marriage cannot be told without the political 
murder, and the assassination would not had any meaning without the disaster of  
the celebration.  
It must be clear now why we are pushed to consider Tellhistory’s historiography 
as poieitcal. The term we are using recalls theories that date back to Aristotle, hence 
theories that need to be contextualized again to become functional. Hence poiein (to 
make) represents in a sense the original Aristotelian root projected toward 
Agamben’s theory of  a whatever-community: if  ethics begins where all the other 
linguistic capacities lack, then all the other discipline which depend on language 
must be reinvented. Historiography as well, this historiography we are trying to 
push into the magmatic present, cannot concern the given state of  affairs that 
characterized traditional historiography: it must be a process in fieri, a form of  
projectuality that works in the present of  personal interpretation. Hence, by 
describing this form of  historiography as poietical, we are just adding a 
microscopical feature to Portelli’s model: for language, rhythm and melody are 
already components both of  the Italian historian’s and the Greek philosopher’s 
theories.  The same goes for Agamben’s theory of  a necessity for ethics: as we 
know from Aristotle’s Poetics (and we already discussed the importance of  mimesis 
under the light of  Ricoeur’s thought), ethos begins as the ‘science of  characters’; in 
this sense, as Sabina and Scheherezade stories demonstrate, two kinds of  
characters are always involved in this production: those described within the stories 
(for example Benazir Bhutto, the firemen etc.) and those who tell the story, namely 
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the improper authors of  their experiences like Sabina, Luciano, Scheherezade and 
many others, who are turned into the material of  the narration in the very moment 
they begin to tell.  For this kind of  poiesis does not involve, in our case, an explicit 
creation of  an artwork, as Aristotle understands it, but a more essential production 
of  model of  being, namely an identity, our idea of  poiesis must necessarily refer to 
Heidegger’s analysis. In Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger has elaborated a model 
of  poiesis which literally contrasts the aristotelian vision which limits the ‘making’ 
to the possibility of  ‘imitating’ defined by the concept of  mimesis. Hence, in the 
Introduction, the new model of  poiesis works to rehabilitate a pre-Socratic notion of  
productivity which was supposed to be strictly related with inherent productivity of  
Being (in its material presence, phusis) and thus opposed to the Platonic/
Aristotelian idealism which relegated Nature into the static field of  ideas rather 
than into the chaotic flux of  becoming. Therefore Heidegger’s notion of  poiesis 
precedes the construction of  any idea concerning the sphere of  Being by showing 
itself  a possibility for the disclosure of  Da-sein :  
Knowledge is the ability to put into work the being of  any particular 
[being]. The Greeks called art in the true sense and the work of  art techne, 
because art is what most immediately brings Being (i.e. the appearing that 
stands there in itself) to stand, stabilizes it in something present (the work). 
The work of  art is a work not primarily because it is wrought, made, but 
because it brings about Being in a being; it brings about the phenomenon in 
which the emerging power, phusis, comes to shine . 56
  Accordingly, the original contact with phusis cannot be solved for Heidegger by a 
synthetic resolution as suggested by Hegelian dialectic : it is precisely this being-in, 
so this being-separated-by that marks the necessity for an action of  production 
which let emerge the sense of  Da-sein from the undefinable ground of  Being. In 
Alexander Ferrari di Pippo’s words:  
Thought in a more original sense, poiesis does not, then, consist in an imitation 
of  a projected model of  stable presence. Rather, poiesis is a response to an 
overpowering experience of  absence and instability, i.e. the concealing 
disclosure of  phusis, which it attempts to overcome by setting Being into work. 
 M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, Nota Bene Series, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 15956
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In so doing, the artwork first opens up a world of  stable intelligibility and so 
orients Da-sein . 57
Nevertheless, despite this argumentation sounds quite convincing for the 
development of  our discourse, we should point out again where this experience of  
estrangement is embodied by in the poietical community. Being the singular 
experience at stake, as Benjamin reminds us, and being the sciences in a difficult 
relationship of  truth with the real world, the primal estrangement is that showed 
out by Agamben: the one with (or against) language. Therefore, only if  we consider 
the tangibleness of  language as the camp of  operability, and we are pretty 
convinced that the depiction of  secondary orality marked by the raising up of  social 
media can definitely demonstrate it, we can indicate a possibility for narrative-
community production as poietical.  
 It seems that a further proof  can be find the famous essay entitled What is 
Literature?,  where Jean Paul Sartre has distinguished the prose from the poetical 
production by appealing to a principle that totally recalls the pure experience of  
language depicted by Agamben: 
For the poet, language is a structure of  the external world. The speaker is in 
a situation in language; he is invested with words. They are prolongations of  his 
meanings, his pincers, his antennae, his eyeglasses. He maneuvers them from 
within; he feels them as if  they were his body; he is surrounded by a verbal 
body which he is hardly aware of  and which extends his action upon the world. 
The poet is outside of  language . 58
It is only by being outside of  language that the ‘global’ or ‘coming’ individual 
can experience language itself: not ‘this or that sentence’ but the universal 
contingence of  any possible language. Therefore, following the idea of  an 
‘objectual language’, we are again pushed to extrapolate a fundamental 
consideration. When language becomes an object, it also becomes universal. The 
 A. Ferrari di Pippo, The Concept of  Poiesis in Heidegger's An Introduction to Metaphysics. In: Thinking 57
Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. 9: Vienna 2000, p. 29
 J.P. Sartre, What is Literature? Translated from the French by Bernard Frechtman, Philosophical 58
Library New York, p. 13
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word pen is penna in Italian and piòro in Polish(it variates in signify something), but 
the object ‘pen’, its general idea (its universal) remains the same all over the world 
(it cannot signify anything). It is clear the we are somehow perpetuating an 
achievement of  Kantian philosophy which catches in the aesthetic judgment a 
form of  hybridity between the sentences concerning mere perceptions and the 
higher sentences based upon intellective reflections. In fact, in the problematic 
oeuvre Critique of  Judgment, Kant names for the first time the original instance of  
‘singular universal’ : 
In all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful, we tolerate no 
one else being of  a different opinion, and in taking up this position we do not 
rest our judgement upon concepts, but only on our feeling. Accordingly we 
introduce this fundamental feeling not as a private feeling, but as a public sense. 
Now, for this purpose, experience cannot be made the ground of  this common 
sense, for the latter is invoked to justify judgements containing an “ought.” The 
assertion is not that every one will fall in with our judgement, but rather that 
every one ought to agree with it. Here I put forward my judgement of  taste as 
an example of  the judgement of  common sense, and attribute to it on that 
account exemplary validity. Hence common sense is a mere ideal norm. With 
this as presupposition, a judgement that accords with it, as well as the delight in 
an object expressed in that judgement, is rightly converted into a rule for 
everyone. For the principle, while it is only subjective, being yet assumed as 
subjectively universal (a necessary idea for everyone), could, in what concerns 
the consensus of  different judging subjects, demand universal assent like an 
objective principle, provided we were assured of  our subsumption under it 
being correct . 59
Accordingly, we can design a triple identity: the aesthetic judgment si a product 
as long as the product (the product of  language) is necessarily in a mediate position 
between the singularity of  the experience and the universality of  language. This 
instance of  poietical narrative we are attempting to show can only subsist on this: 
the universal crash of  the individual into the universality of  language. With an 
incredible turn, we translated the word into a thing, and we can progressively 
understand how fast we are moving trough an horizon in which the boundary 
between discourse and action turns out to be extremely thin. 
 I. Kant, Critique of  Judgement, Translated by James Creed Meredith, Oxford University Press. (Original work 59
published 1790) Retrieved from http://bradleymurray.ca, p. 239
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As the singular experiencer of  this quiddity of  language, the language user is 
unavoidably a poet. This incredible turn that makes every speaker, from the 
acculturated Harvard student to the illiterate Kurdish shepherd, a poet, can make 
us catch a glimpse of  solution to the problem of  narratives. The popular formula 
of  ‘singular universal’, dear to the late existentialist movement, is able to posit the 
‘coming individual’ beyond the limits of  the mere autobiographic narration, by 
allowing him to reach the universal, omnicomprehensive metaphorical level of  
communication: yet, a communication which transcends signification by being 
absolutely interchangeable in its structural elements (the stories, the memories). 
Thus, this solution can even surpass the Appadurai’s model of  imaginary: whereas 
the imaginary turns out to be a set of  categories which overrules the free 
experience of  the individual, the poiesis conversely stresses the singular capacity, 
absolutely accidental, to show the universal limits of  language-object experience. 
Again, it is through this dexterity of  language that the poiesis of  self-production is 
simultaneously projected in the atomistic sphere of  personal living and toward the 
general, formalized representation of  history. It constitutes its ‘void space’ of  
incommunicability which triggers action (ethics) and invention (narration): this is 
what we call poietical history. 
Finally, there is a last formal reason thanks to which the poietical community is 
paradigmatically captured by Tellhistory.  When we encountered the model of  
‘secondary orality’ developed by Liliana Bounegru, we blindly accepted all the 
characteristics which define it: to resume it briefly, it describes that plateau in which 
the written language is based upon a spoken, dialogical ground which makes it 
interactive, tribal, and intersubjective. Furthermore, this kind of  textual orality, 
according to Bounegru, emerged from the last social media revolution marked by 
the birth of  platforms like Twitter and Facebook. Indeed, this ultimate advent 
made us aware of  the imminent (we should say ‘messianic’, for never being 
completely realized) re-tribalization constituted by the pure experience of  language 
coming along with a technologic innovation. 
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Nevertheless, we should argue that secondary orality existed many centuries 
before the invention of  contemporary social media, despite being created after a 
particular (the most incredible)  human invention. This invention which first 
carried out secondary orality was indeed writing, and its specific form was the 
poem. Since the homeric literature, poetry has almost ever acted as the sign for the 
voice, as the presence for the absence of  the human. But, if  for Homeric 
production seems licit to adopt the limit of  orality to the argument of  formula, as 
Milman Parry argued , for contemporary poetry and narration (in which, of  60
course, we include all the forms of  poietical narratives) the mere formula is 
abandoned for a more free form of  expression which always involves both the 
singular point of  view oriented toward a universal field of  possibility.  
Cuando en días venideros, libre el hombre  
Del mundo primitivo a que hemos vuelto  
De tiniebla y de horror, lleve el destino  
Tu mano hacia el volumen donde yazcan  
Olvidados mis versos, y lo abras,  
Yo sé que sentirás mi voz llegarte,  
No de la letra vieja, mas del fondo  
Vivo en tu entraña, con un afán sin nombre  
Que tú dominarás. Escúchame y comprende.  
En sus limbos mi alma quizá recuerde algo, 
Y entonces en ti mismo mis sueños y deseos 
Tendrán razón al fin, y habré vivido . 61
The examples that might be quoted to sustain this argument are almost infinite: 
it would be more difficult to demonstrate that the tangible, human voice tends to 
disappear from the poetical composition rather than to prove its contrary. That 
does not mean that the textual turns out to be absolutely irrelevant; on the 
contrary, the written constitutes that polarity, together with the spoken, in between 
 A. Parry, The Making of  the Homeric Verse. The Collected Papers of  Milman Parry, Oxford, Clarendon 60
Press, 1971
 L. Cernuda, “ A un Poeta Futuro”, in Como quien espera el alba, 1941-1944: La realidad y el deseo VIII, 61
Losada, 1947 
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which the poietical performs its activity. Still, this new voice, which manifests itself  
through the textuality of  social network, through recitative memories, through 
journal articles, through poetry, embodies the unique possible medium for the 
poietical community to realize its essence.  
Thus, to conclude, we should resume the main point according to which we 
ended by indicating our specific theory, hoping that someone will soon finds up its 
limits in order to develop new approaches: 
1) With poietical community we indicate the field of  possibility in which all the 
singular identifying communities are annihilated by the universal experience of  
language. By not being a peculiar symbolic order, it unavoidably transcends the 
traditional signification which belongs to any community: thus, it can only be 
performed and not meant, produced and not used, lived and not understood.  
2) With poietical narrative we point to the void space which problematically 
separated the dominant narratives, embodied by the supremacy of  written texts 
( which can be declined as western, colonial, intellectual, political, authoritative) 
from the non-intelligible sphere of  individual narratives. The poietical indicates 
that intrinsic possibility to produce discourses which depart from the individual 
experience to reach, trough the amplification of  voice, the universality 
constituted by the global experience of  language. What is produced by this 
narrative is not directly a discourse, but the the possibility of  all the other 
discourses: in this sense, it creates the laboratory in which new ethics and 
narrations are about to be forged. 
3) With poietical history we show the necessity to develop a kind of  historiography 
which would account the emergent presence of  poietical narratives all over the 
world. Indeed, it must aspire to delimit an history of  the present which cannot 
avoid the claim of  individual to produce their own historiography. 
Consequently, this historiography cannot be delimited by the narratives of  
states, nations or ethnical groups: it must adapt itself  to the impossibility to 
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relegate history in a specific order, but enlarge it to the lack of  symbolic order 
embodied within the poietical community and marked by the emergent 
poietical narratives. 
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